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Abstract—This article surveys blockchain-based approaches for
several security services. These services include authentication,
confidentiality, privacy and access control list (ACL), data and
resource provenance, and integrity assurance. All these services
are critical for the current distributed applications, especially due
to the large amount of data being processed over the networks and
the use of cloud computing. Authentication ensures that the user
is who he/she claims to be. Confidentiality guarantees that data
cannot be read by unauthorized users. Privacy provides the users
the ability to control who can access their data. Provenance allows
an efficient tracking of the data and resources along with their
ownership and utilization over the network. Integrity helps in
verifying that the data has not been modified or altered. These
services are currently managed by centralized controllers, for
example, a certificate authority. Therefore, the services are prone
to attacks on the centralized controller. On the other hand,
blockchain is a secured and distributed ledger that can help
resolve many of the problems with centralization. The objectives
of this paper are to give insights on the use of security services for
current applications, to highlight the state of the art techniques
that are currently used to provide these services, to describe their
challenges, and to discuss how the blockchain technology can
resolve these challenges. Further, several blockchain-based
approaches providing such security services are compared
thoroughly. Challenges associated with using blockchain-based
security services are also discussed to spur further research in this
area.
Index Terms—blockchains, public key cryptography,
provenance, data privacy, access control list, integrity assurance,
blockchain challenges.

I.

INTRODUCTION

A blockchain is a secured, shared and distributed ledger that
facilitates the process of recording and tracking resources
without the need of a centralized trusted authority. It allows two
parties to communicate and exchange resources in a peer-topeer network where distributed decisions are made by the
majority rather than by a single centralized authority. It is
provably secure against attackers who try to control the system
by compromising the centralized controller. Resources can be
tangible (e.g., money, houses, cars, lands) or intangible (e.g.
copyrights, digital documents, and intellectual property rights).
In general, anything that has a value can be tracked on a
blockchain network to reduce its security risks and save the cost
of security monitoring for all involved [1].
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Recently, the blockchain technology has attracted
tremendous interest from both academia and industry. The
technology started with Bitcoin, a cryptocurrency that has
reached a capitalization of 180 billion dollars as of January
2018 [2] [3]. According to the Gartner report in 2016, the
blockchain technology is receiving billions of dollars in
research and enterprise investments and much more is expected
to come in the near future [4]. The technology currently spans
several applications that are popular and driving the networking
research. Such applications include healthcare [5], Internet of
Things (IoT) [6] [7], and cloud storage [8]. Generally, the
blockchain technology has proven its potential in any
application that currently requires a centralized ledger. A
practical example that employs blockchains is the Interbank
Information Network provided by JP Morgan which provides
fast, secured, and cheap international payments [9]. In addition,
supply chain systems by IBM is exploring the potential of using
blockchains in their services [10].
Among the blockchains’ promising applications are network
monitoring and security services including authentication,
confidentiality, privacy, integrity, and provenance. Currently,
these services are provided by trusted third-party brokers or
using inefficient distributed approaches. As a result, security is
a major challenge for current applications. On the other hand,
the blockchain technology can provide security guarantees that
resolve many traditional challenges in addition to providing a
fully distributed, provably secure, and consensus solution.
Fig. 1 illustrates the differences between the traditional and the
blockchain-based access control. The same concept can be
applied to the other security guarantees.
This survey focuses on the use of the blockchain technology
to provide network security services and applications. We
present the use of these services in the current applications,
discuss the conventional techniques that provide these security
services, and illustrate their challenges and problems. Then, we
present how the blockchain technology can be used to resolve
the associated challenges and highlight several proposed
blockchain-based approaches that provide the desired security
services. Finally, we discuss the current challenges faced with
blockchain and some of the potential future research directions
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in this field. It should be noted that the details of the blockchain
technology and how it is used in other domains are out of the
scope of this paper. We refer the readers to [1] and [2] for more
details on the blockchain technology.

Fig. 1: (a) Traditional centralized access control guarantees
(b) Blockchain-based access control guarantees

A. Related Work
With the current growing interest in the blockchain
technology, many new platforms and applications have been
proposed. Several survey papers have been written to highlight
the benefits of this technology for the current applications.
Examples of such surveys include the blockchain technology
for IoT [7], healthcare [5] and decentralized digital currencies
[11]. Other surveys have discussed blockchain challenges,
opportunities, and future visions. For example, the authors in
[12] discuss the blockchain security issues and challenges. The
work in [13] presents a thorough survey on blockchain security
and privacy issues including possible attacks and
countermeasures. Moreover, a recent special issue of IEEE
spectrum is dedicated to blockchains and their potential uses
[14].
This paper investigates the use of the blockchain technology
in a different set of applications with rising interests that have
not been discussed in the prior surveys. We aim to provide a
comprehensive survey on the use of the blockchain technology
in security services. The services can be offered by an enterprise
and verified globally, offered by an enterprise but not verified,
or presented as a research work. We strive these services to give
insights on the current state-of-the-art technology and its
challenges and discuss how the blockchain technology can be
used to resolve these challenges.
B. Security Services and Mechanisms
According to the X.800 family of standards [15], security
services can be defined as the services that aid the open system

interconnection protocols in providing adequate security to the
transferred data over the system. These services can be divided
into six categories: authentication, data privacy, data integrity,
data confidentiality, non-repudiation and data provenance. The
authentication service includes data origin authentication and
entity authentication. The mechanisms to achieve this service
include encryption and digital signature schemes. These
mechanisms can be provided using public key cryptography,
which will be explained later in Section III. The data privacy
service can be achieved by access control mechanisms. The
data confidentiality service can also be obtained by encryption
and; therefore, public key cryptography can be used. The data
integrity service can be achieved by message authentication
codes using the secret key or the public key cryptography. The
integrity mechanisms include replicating of the data and
validating that replicas match. The non-repudiation service
assures that no one can deny his/her action later and this can be
provided using digital signature schemes; therefore, public key
cryptography techniques can be employed. Further, we add the
data provenance as another service to achieve tracking and
monitoring of the data or resources. Table I summarizes these
security services and their associated mechanisms.
In this paper, we consider the blockchain-based security
services. Therefore, our discussion will include services such as
authentication, data privacy, data integrity, and data
confidentiality. Authentication and confidentiality are both
provided by the public key cryptography; hence, these two will
be combined in the same section. Privacy and integrity will be
discussed in separate sections. It should be noted that nonrepudiation is already provided by blockchain as will be
explained later in Section II; therefore, we will not consider it
among the services discussed later in the paper.
C. Paper Organization
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section II gives
a brief background on the blockchain architecture and its key
properties and platforms. Section III discusses both the
traditional and the blockchain-based approaches in providing
authentication and encryption by public key cryptography and
key management techniques. Section IV describes both the
traditional and the blockchain-based approaches to provide
privacy and access control lists (ACL). Section V presents both
the traditional and the blockchain-based approaches to provide
provenance services that track and report the data and resources
shared in the network. Both the traditional and the blockchainbased approaches for integrity services to check for correctness

TABLE I
SECURITY SERVICES VERSUS SECURITY MECHANISMS
Services

Encryption

Digital Signature

Authentication

X

X

Data Privacy

X

Data Confidentiality
Non-Repudiation
Data Provenance

Mechanisms
Message Authentication Code Public key cryptography

Access Control

Provenance
Techniques

X
X

Data Integrity

X

X
X

X
X
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X
X
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and reliability of the data are discussed in Section VI.
Section VII focuses on the challenges currently faced with the
use of the blockchain technology and their effect on security
services. Finally, Section VIII summarizes the discussion and
highlights the main presented points.
II. BLOCKCHAIN BACKGROUND
In this section, a brief introduction to the blockchain
technology is first presented. Following that, mining or block
construction techniques are explained. The appealing
characteristics of blockchains are also discussed along with a
comparison
of
different
open-source
blockchain
implementations. The objective of this section is to introduce
the readers to the blockchain technology and its key principles.
A. Blockchain Architecture
A blockchain consists of a database and a network of nodes,
as illustrated in Fig. 2. A blockchain database is a shared,
distributed, fault-tolerant and append-only database that
maintains the records in blocks. Although the blocks are
accessible by all the blockchain users, they cannot be deleted or
altered by them. The blocks are connected to each other in a
chain as each block has a hash value of its predecessor. Each
block contains several verified transactions. Also, each block
includes a timestamp indicating the creation time of that block,
and a random number (nonce) for cryptographic operations.
The blockchain network consists of nodes that maintain the
blockchain in a peer-to-peer, distributed fashion. All nodes
have access to the blocks, but they cannot completely control
them.

Fig. 2: Blockchain network, database, blocks, and transactions

The blockchain technology allows the communicating
parties to interact in the absence of a trusted third-party. The
interactions are recorded in the blockchain database providing
the desired security requirements. When a blockchain user
needs to interact with another user, it broadcasts its
“transaction” to the blockchain network. Several nodes in the
network check if the interactions are valid and construct a new
block of valid transactions by mining (i.e., combining several
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valid transactions). The making of the blocks will be discussed
further in the next subsection. If the new block is found valid,
it is attached to the blockchain database and cannot be deleted
or altered later. Otherwise, the block is dropped. Both the
transactions and the blocks are signed; hence, they cannot be
reverted or denied in the future.
The blockchain technology has three generations that support
money transactions, assets, and smart contracts, respectively.
The first generation was published by Satoshi Nakamoto in
2009 [1]. The application of this generation was restricted to
money transactions and was implemented as a part of the
Bitcoin cryptocurrency, which was the first application utilizing
the blockchain concept. The second generation of the
blockchain technology had broader use cases that exchanged
assets rather than just money. In this generation, users own
“shares” or “assets” and they can exchange any type of assets,
including goods, properties and even votes [2]. In the third
generation of the blockchain, smart contracts were introduced.
A smart contract is a programmable contract that is checked by
everyone in the network; thus, it compels both communication
parties to strictly follow the contracts. The capabilities of
blockchains were enhanced significantly within the third
generation which led to its worldwide popularity and an
increasing interest in its applications for several other critical
services [6].
B. Mining a Block in a Blockchain
Mining is the process of creating blocks that will be attached
to the database. In some of the blockchain applications, such as
in Bitcoin, the miner who creates the first valid block is
rewarded. This reward is given by the system and is generally
in terms of money for financial applications. Mining is one of
the critical concepts in the blockchain technology. It allows
nodes to create blocks which will be validated by others as well.
If the new block is found as valid, it is attached to the
blockchain database. Nodes that try to create blocks are called
“mining nodes.” The mining nodes race to validate the
transactions and create a new block as fast as they can to win
the reward.
Several approaches exist to decide which miner wins,
including proof of work (PoW) [16], proof of Stake (PoS) [17],
Proof of Space (PoSpace) [18], Proof of Importance (PoI) [19],
Measure of Trust (MoT) [20], minimum block hash [21], and
Practical Byzantine Fault Tolerance (PBFT) [22]. In the
following, we summarize these major mining approaches (see
also Table II).
• Proof of Work: PoW is the mining technique used in Bitcoin
and is currently used by many other blockchain technologies.
It requires the mining nodes to solve a hard-mathematical
puzzle that is changed frequently and has been agreed by all
the miners. Once a node validates the transactions and solves
the puzzle, the block is submitted to the blockchain network.
Other mining nodes validate the block to make sure that the
submitter is not falsifying. Once it is agreed among the miners
that the block is legit, it will be added to the blockchain and
the submitter will be rewarded. The agreement here is based
on a majority consensus. Thus, it is difficult to fake unless the
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attackers compromise more than 50 percent of the mining
nodes. The problem with this approach is that high
computational power is wasted in solving the mathematical
puzzle [16].
TABLE II
COMPARISON OF DIFFERENT MINING TECHNIQUES
Mining
approach

Resources
needed

Randomness

Implementations

Reward
miner?

POW

High
computation
power

No
randomness

Bitcoin

Yes

PoS

Wealth or stake

Randomized
blockchain
selection

Ethereum

No

PoSpace

High memory

No
randomness

Permacoin

Yes

PoI

Node
significance

No
randomness

NEM

Yes

MoT

Trustworthiness

No
randomness

Not
implemented

Yes
(trust)

Minimum
block
hash

None

Randomized
blockchain
selection

Bitcoin
extension

Yes

PBFT

None

No
randomness

Hyperledger

No

• Proof of Stake: Unlike PoW, PoS does not require the
mining nodes to solve a computationally expensive
mathematical puzzle. Instead, the next block creator or miner
is chosen in a pseudo-random way. The chance of a node
being chosen to create the new block depends on the node’s
wealth or stake. In other words, the more money a node has,
the higher its chances to mine a block. The native version of
PoS does not award the miner; however, the extended
versions award and punish the creators based on their
performance. Selection based on the wealthiest account may
result in a single account handling all the creations; hence, it
may lead to an unfair distribution or even centralization.
Therefore, a randomized node selection and a coin age-based
selection have been proposed. In coin age-based method, the
users that have not created any block for the past 30 days are
considered for mining [17].
• Proof of Space: PoSpace is similar to PoW except that the
puzzle requires a lot of storage. A miner proves its ability to
create a new block by allocating the required storage space
to perform mining. In other words, instead of having a high
computational capability, the mining node needs to have a
high storage capability. Several theoretical and practical
implementations of PoSpace have been released; however,
the required high memory space is a challenge similar to the
computation challenge of PoW [18].
• Proof of Importance: PoI is a mining technique that
calculates the significance of an individual node based on the
transaction amount and the balance of that node. It assigns a
priority with a hash calculation to the more significant nodes.
Further, the node with the highest priority is chosen for the
next block creation [19].
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• Measure of Trust: Another way to perform mining is to use
dynamic trust measurements and select the node with the
highest trust level as the block initiator [20]. The
trustworthiness is based on the nodes’ behaviors; therefore,
good behaving nodes that follow the protocols are rewarded.
More specifically, the trustworthiness could be formulated as
the expected value of the node’s behavior in the future. This,
the trustworthiness is approximated by the history of good
and bad actions that the node has taken so far. The MoT
approach could be subject to malicious attacks if a specific
node plans to increase its trustworthiness for several
iterations in order to attack the network later. The authors in
[20] proposed several mechanisms to handle such attacks.
• Minimum Block Hash: In [21], the authors proposed an
approach for mining where the miner is chosen randomly and
not based on its resources. The system selects the miners
based on a generated minimum hash value across the entire
network. Thus, the selection of the next miner is randomized
and the probability of selecting the same miner is low. This
approach was implemented on a modified Bitcoin network
and it was shown to offer energy savings for mining.
However, it has not been adopted by the Bitcoin community.
• Practical Byzantine Fault Tolerance: Unlike others, PBFT
[22] is a consensus approach that does not include any type
of resources but utilizes the blockchain consensus based on
the Byzantine fault tolerance approach. In this approach,
first, a leader is selected and agreed among the nodes. The
leader decides on the transactions’ validation and publishes a
block to all the nodes in the blockchain network. A
transaction is committed to a new block only if two-thirds of
the mining nodes verify its correctness. The leader changes
frequently; therefore, the approach is not considered as
centralized. PBFT has been shown to be faster than other
methods; however, it suffers from scalability issues due to
the resulting communication overhead as discussed in [23].

C. Key Properties of Blockchains
Key properties of the blockchain technology include their
distributed nature, decentralized consensus, trustless system,
cryptographic security, and non-repudiation guarantees. In
Table III, we briefly summarize these properties and the
problems they try to solve.
TABLE III
KEY PROPERTIES OF BLOCKHAINS
Property

Problem to be solved

Blockchains’ solution

Distributed
Nature

Current applications are
distributed by nature,
therefore, require
distributed control and
security mechanisms.
Most of the current
practical security
solutions are centralized
and inefficient for these
applications.

The blockchains are
distributed by nature.
Thus, blockchain-based
security services can be
implemented in a
distributed fashion

Decentralized
Consensus

Centralized decisions by
one controller can make
the controller a single
point of failure.

The blockchain
decisions are achieved
by decentralized
consensus, majority
votes, and nodes
agreement.
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Trustless System

Security provided by
third parties can impose
security and privacy risks
if the party is
compromised

The blockchain
technology imposes a
trust of majority votes,
which is impenetrable to
compromise unless
attackers have control
over the entire system.

Cryptographic
Security

Algorithms for security
should prove that they
are supremely difficult to
break.

The blockchains use
elliptic curve
cryptography that is
difficult to break.
Further, the trustless
system and the
decentralized consensus
make it even more
difficult to break.

Non-repudiation
Guarantee

Users can deny their
interactions in the system

The blockchains use
signatures of
transactions and blocks
in addition to permanent
databases such that
transactions cannot be
denied later.

D. Blockchain Open-Source Implementations
As there are many open-source implementations of the
blockchain technology, the choice of which implementation to
use is challenging. In Table IV, we compare different aspects
of several popular blockchain implementations. We will be
referring to these implementations throughout this paper when
we discuss the blockchain-based security services. It is
important to keep these features in mind to highlight the
properties of each implementation. It should be noted that these
are not the only implementations and many others exist in the
literature. However, these are the most popular ones used in the
majority of the blockchain applications.
TABLE IV
OPEN-SOURCE IMPLEMENTATIONS OF BLOCKCHAINS
COMPARISON
Platform

Smart
contract

Mining

Advantages

Disadvantages

Bitcoin [25]

No

POW

• Scalable
in terms of
the number
of nodes
and users.
• Currently
most
popular

• Computationally
expensive.
• Time
consuming

Ethereum
[26]

Yes

POW
or PoS

• Scalable
• For PoS
mining,
no
computation
is required.

• Require stake or
wealth to be
selected for mining

HyperLedger
[27]

Yes

PBFT

• No
minting and
thus faster
than all
others
(promised)

• Scalability
problem. Does not
scale above 20
nodes as reported
in [24]

E. Summary
A blockchain is a distributed, shared, append-only, and
permanent database that was first utilized by Bitcoin for

5

cryptocurrency applications. Its key properties include
distributed nature, consensus, trustless system, cryptographic
security and non-repudiation guarantees. These properties make
the blockchain technology a potential approach for the current
distributed applications including IoT, healthcare, and
automated supply chains. Several variations of the blockchain
technology exist in the literature to solve the challenges
introduced in the first generation. One of the critical challenges
in Bitcoin mining is the computational capability that is
required to perform mining. Alternatives to PoW mining
include: PoS, PoSpace, PoI, MoT, minimum block hash, and
BPFT. These alternatives resulted in many open-source
blockchain platforms that developers can choose depending on
the application. In the remainder of this paper, we assume that
the reader has the knowledge of the discussed platforms and
their variations, as well as the advantages, and disadvantages of
each.
III. ENCRYPTION AND THE AUTHENTICATION SERVICES
Encryption and authentication are two of the most important
security services that must be provided in any network system.
In general, these services can be granted using public key
cryptography as one of the well-known security frameworks.
The public key cryptography techniques require the entities to
have private and public information. They need an
infrastructure to create, revoke, manage, distribute, use, and
store the generated keys or the generated information. In this
section, the public key cryptography and its uses in today’s
applications are first discussed. Following that, an introduction
to the public key management techniques and their challenges
are presented. Then, an overview of how the blockchains can
be used to solve these challenges and some blockchain-based
key management techniques are discussed and compared.
A. Public Key Cryptography and Its Services
Public key cryptography, also known as asymmetric
cryptography, is a cryptographic technique that uses a pair of
keys: public keys which are distributed over the system and
private keys which are kept secret. It was introduced initially by
Diffie and Hellman in 1975 and is still widely adopted. The
basic idea is to use one of the keys to do a task (encryption or
signature) and use the other key to do the reverse of that task
(decryption or validation). In this way, every entity can verify
the message coming from a certain user by the user’s public
key. The reply message can also be encrypted before sending it
back. Only that specific user can sign/decrypt the message with
its private key.
The public key cryptography can be used for many security
services including the entity authentication and the
confidentiality. As illustrated in Fig. 3, the entity authentication
service can be provided by the signature/verification procedure.
An entity sends a message signed with its private key and
everyone can verify/authenticate that entity by validating the
signature with the entity’s public key. Since the private key is
kept confidential, no one can sign the message except the entity
itself or someone who has access to the private key. On the
other hand, the verification is done with the public keys. Thus,
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everyone with the user’s public information can verify and
authenticate that user.
The confidentiality service can be achieved by
encryption/decryption, which is a similar procedure. The
encryption is done by the sender with the receiver’s public key.
The decryption is done by the receiver with his private key.
Only the receiver, or someone who has the receiver’s private
key, will be able to decrypt and understand the data. Therefore,
the confidentiality is guaranteed.

Fig. 3: Illustration of public key services

B. Services’ Importance for the Current Applications
Entity authentication and message confidentiality are the
most critical services in almost all of the current network
applications. A smart healthcare environment is a typical
example of the importance of these services. The system is
required to secure the transmitted data in order to keep patients’
privacy from intruders. Further, it is crucial to authenticate the
right doctor, the hospital and the pharmacy and secure their
access to the data.
To generate the private/public keys for the system, many
algorithms have been proposed, including RSA [28], ElGamal
[29], and elliptic curve [30]. Discussing these algorithms is out
of the scope of this paper. However, in general, these are
complex and need an infrastructure to generate and manage the
public/private keys. The certificate authorities (CA), the web of
trust (WoT) and the entity-based cryptosystem have been
introduced to create, manage, use, store, and distribute the keys.
In the following subsections, we discuss both the traditional and
the blockchain-based key management approaches, including
CA and the web of trust. In a later subsection, we discuss the
entity-based cryptosystem which is the current trend that
extends the CA mechanisms to make a better use of the public
key cryptography.
C. Key Management by the Public Key Infrastructure (PKI)
The public key infrastructure (PKI) is one way to provide the
key management for the public key cryptography.
Traditionally, there are two conventional approaches to achieve
PKI, centralized by a CA and decentralized by WoT. The CAbased PKI is the most commonly used approach and it has been
standardized in the X.509 standard [31]. In this approach, the
CA is a third-party entity that is trusted by all members in the
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system. The CA issues “certificates,” which authenticate users
and bind each user to a public key. A signed certificate, binding
a user to its public key, will authenticate the ownership of that
public key to that specific user. The other traditional approach
is WoT, which was proposed in 1992 by Phil Zimmerman. This
technique utilizes a decentralized approach in which the keys
are generated locally and will be trusted if they are verified by
at least one other trusted user in the system [32].
D. Problems with the Traditional PKI Systems
Both of the traditional techniques suffer from several
challenges which are discussed in this subsection.
The CA-based PKI comes with three major challenges: a
trusted third party, a single-point-of-failure, and cost. The users
of the systems must trust the CA in generating and managing
their public keys which imposes high-security risks if the CA is
compromised. This architecture has a single point of failure as
the whole system fails if the CA fails. Furthermore, the
management of the public keys by one centralized CA can be
both expensive and inefficient, especially with the current
massively distributed applications where a large number of
users are involved [33].
On the other hand, in the WoT-based PKI, the signers need
to build trustworthiness. The users join the network only if they
are trusted by another “trusted” member. In other words, new
members joining the network need to build prior trust with other
members who are already in the system. This can lead to a
barrier for new members entering the network [33].
Moreover, both the CA-based and the WoT-based PKI are
unable to provide identity retention. That is, it is possible for a
user to impersonate the identity or the public key of an already
registered user. Some proposals have been offered to solve this
problem; however, they are mostly log-based, which could be
highly complex, especially in the case of the worldwide
distribution of the users [33].
E. Blockchain-Based PKI Concept
The distributed, the event-recording and non-reproducibility
features of the blockchain technology make it a desirable
technique for several applications. Particularly, these properties
prove the blockchains’ suitability for PKI and domain name
services (DNS). Since the blockchain-based PKI solutions are
distributed; they have no centralized point of failure. The trust
is built based on the majority vote of the miners; hence, there is
no single trusted third-party and it does not require prior
trustworthiness in the system. More importantly, the blockchain
technology has several open-source implementations, which
helps build cost-effective and efficient solutions. The problems
with the traditional approaches and how the blockchains can
solve them is summarized in Table V.
In the following, we discuss several approaches to achieve
blockchain-based PKI.
1) Instant Karma PKI (IKP)
The Instant Karma PKI (IKP) framework extends the
traditional CA approach by recording the CA behavior to the
blockchain database. In this way, misbehaving or compromised
CAs can be detected by the network and a riposte must happen.
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The event recording feature of the blockchains facilitates the
CA tracking and monitoring by the blockchain users and helps
detect the misbehaving CAs. This approach can reduce the trust
problem in the traditional CA-based algorithm as eventually
misbehaving CA can be detected.
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keys. The architecture of this approach is illustrated in Fig. 4,
where a Centralized CA (CCA) is assumed to be fully secured.
Several validators, donated as Device Manufacturer Validators
(DMVs), are connected to the CCA.

TABLE V
THE TRADITIONAL PKI PROBLEMS AND THE BLOCKCHAINBASED SOLUTIONS
The traditional The problem
The blockchains solution
approach
CA-based PKI
Third party trust
The distributed consensus
Single point of failure
property of blockchains
Cost of deployment
No centralized authority
Open source
implementations
WoT-based PKI

Prior trustworthiness

Does not require any
previous trust. The
decisions are made based
on majority votes

CA-based and
WoT-based PKI

Identity retention

The technology has an
event recording database
and it thus can verify if the
public key has been
registered before or not

IKP is a research work that was proposed in 2017 and
verified in terms of cost saving and distribution. An open source
implementation was also promised but has not come available
at the time of this writing [34]. However, having a CA in the
system still lead to a single point of failure system. Trying to
solve this matter by having several CAs imposes cost; thus,
leading to even a more expensive solution.
2) Pemcor
Pemcor utilizes the blockchain database as a distributed and
secure data store [35]. The idea is to let the CA issue a
certificate which is not signed. Instead, the hash value of the
certificate is stored in the blockchain which is controlled by
authorities, like by banks or governments. Such authorities
share two blockchain databases, one for the generated
certificates and one for the revoked certificates. When
verifying, the authority checks its maintained blockchain data
stores. If the hash of the certificate exists in the generated
certificate blockchain and is not in the revoked certificates
blockchain, the certificate is valid; otherwise, it is not. This idea
is simple and provides several advantages such as an easy
verification with low delay guarantees.
Pemcor is part of a project that aims to find a solution for
identity proofing and replaces the traditional knowledge-based
verification. The project was proposed and documented
theoretically by several white papers in 2016, however, it still
lacks the complete implementation and the evaluation of the
system. Given other approaches presented in this section, this
work is not expected to contribute further to the blockchainbased PKI systems.
3) Gan’s Approach
In [36], the authors propose a key-based authentication
system dedicated to the IoT environments. The idea is to use a
private blockchain for storing the nodes’ latest public keys,
validating the keys, and allowing others to request the nodes’

Fig. 4: The architecture of Gan’s approach

The DMVs are hosted by the IoT manufacturers and they are
required to have the computational capabilities to generate the
public/private keys, to perform mining and to maintain the
blockchain database. The IoT devices are connected to these
validators and are assumed to be simple without any
computational capability. Initially, a DMV joins the blockchain
network by requesting the CCA to authenticate it. The CCA
validates the DMV and constructs a transaction that contains
the DMV public key, the validator address, and the CCA’s
signature. The transaction is submitted to the blockchain and
the DMV is now known to the others. Accordingly, the DMV
can add a new IoT node by submitting a transaction containing
the node’s public key and address to the blockchain.
Furthermore, the DMVs can update or revoke their IoT devices’
public keys by submitting transactions.
This work has an open-source implementation that is
available on GitHub and referenced in [36]. The
implementation utilizes Network Simulator version 3 (NS3) to
build and evaluate their proposed approach. Even though the
approach was initially applied to the IoT platforms, the idea can
be implemented in any other networking applications including
sensor networks, health care, or even micro clouds platforms.
It should be noted that these previously discussed three
approaches use the blockchains only as distributed databases to
share and validate the keys. In other words, they do not benefit
from the other important properties of the blockchains
including the distributed consensus and the non-repudiation
guarantees. In addition, as it was mentioned before, having a
CA that generates the keys does not resolve the problems of
centralization; hence, the single point of failure in the
traditional PKI approaches.
4) Distributed PKI (DPKI)
In [37], the authors sketch the principles of an appropriate
blockchain-based PKI, which is referred to as Distributed PKI
(DPKI). The DPKI uses the blockchain technology as a
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distributed, trustless database that eliminates the need for a CA
and gives the users the direct control and ownership of their
data. This work uses a web registration domain, where the user
spawns its public/private key and submits the public key to the
blockchain network as a transaction. In this work, it is claimed
that the blockchain technology can resolve the traditional
problems and protects the network against man in the middle
attacks. This protection is granted by linking the most recent
key of the user to his/her identity.
The paper did not include any implementation-related
aspects; nevertheless, it introduced the possibility of
blockchain-based PKI, which was later implemented in many
other works as will be discussed next.
5) Blockstack
Blockstack ID is an appropriate blockchain-based approach
that uses Namecoin to build a distributed PKI system.
Namecoin, [39], is a fork of Bitcoin that allows data storage
within the blockchain transactions. It is implemented by
defining a name-value pair that is used to store usernames and
can be recorded in the transactions. Namecoin was originated
to store the DNS names, allowing users to register their humanreadable name and associating names with the corresponding
public keys.
Blockstack ID modifies Namecoin by adding another namevalue pair dedicated for the public keys. The advantage of using
Namecoin is that it already supports the name-value pairs in its
transactions. Thus, the public key is the value and the name is
the identity of the owner. Blockstack implementation binds the
user identity to an elliptic curve public key which is one of the
strongest public key cryptography mechanisms to date.
Blockstack was released as an open-source software in 2014
and is currently serving as a PKI system for 55,000 users. It is
probably the most popular blockchain-based PKI among other
techniques discussed in this section. However, some issues such
as how the system would handle the public key updates, the
lookups, and the revocations have not been considered in
Blockstack. Also, the identity retention problem is not been
resolved.
6) Certcoin
Certcoin, [40], is another fully decentralized PKI that relies
on Namecoin to build its platform. Unlike Blockstack ID, this
platform provides the identity retention guarantee. As in the
traditional PKI approaches, this system is composed of 5
functions: registration, update, lookup, verification and
revocation. During the registration, the owner originates its own
private and public keys locally. It keeps the private key to itself
and submits a transaction of the public key and its signature to
the blockchain. The blockchain network verifies the transaction
signature and the fact that this ownership was not registered
before in the system. If the verification is successful, the (IDpublic key) tuple is added to the blockchain; otherwise, it is
dropped. To update the public key, the owner submits a
transaction containing the identity along with the previous
public key, the new public key, and the signature. Miners need
to verify that the signature is correct, the identity exists in the
blockchain, and it is associated with the previous public key.
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Then the mined blocks are broadcasted to the network to be
verified. The verification follows a similar process where the
owner submits a transaction requesting the blockchain network
to verify the key which can be done by the miners and other
blockchain nodes.
Certcoin has 3 versions, numbered 0, 1, and 2. The first
version (version 0) required complex computations and
operations while the second and the third versions tried to
reduce this complexity by accelerating the blockchain
processing. Version 0 had all the five functions submitted and
mined by the blockchain network as in Bitcoin. However, those
functions are complex and result in a computationally
expensive process. Thus, versions 1 and 2 tried to reduce this
complexity by a cryptographic accumulator and a distributed
hash table, respectively. A cryptographic accumulator is a
space-efficient data structure that is used to reduce the time and
the complexity of the verification process [41]. A distributed
hash table supports fast look-ups for the public key queries;
hence, the complexity of the lookup and the verification is
reduced [42]. Therefore, the verification, the lookup and the
update functions have been simplified in both versions 1 and 2.
Similar to Blockstack, Certcoin is an open-source
implementation that was first released in 2014. The project was
one of the first blockchain-based PKI and is offered by MIT
[40]. However, Certcoin is less popular compared to Blockstack
due to the lack of proper documentations and the lack of updates
to the software.
7) Guardtime Solution
Guardtime provides another solution for secure
authentications of the IoT devices using the blockchains and
physically unclonable functions (PUFs). A PUF is a digital
fingerprint hardware that serves as a unique identifier of the
devices. The PUFs use the unique characteristics of each device
to generate its unique private/public keys. Guardtime employs
PUFs to generate the public/private keys. The public keys are
submitted to the blockchain in transactions. IoT devices have
limited memory; hence, they cannot store large private/public
keys [43]. In other words, the solution provided by PUF and
Guardtime helps such devices regenerating the same key each
time it is needed.
Guardtime is an enterprise that currently offers blockchainbased solutions for several industries including the insurance
companies, the physical supply chains, the cloud providers, and
many others. Guardtime Federal is a fork from Guardtime that
started in 2014 and is dedicated to providing cyber-security
solutions for the US department of Defense, the U.S.
Intelligence Community, and other U.S. Government
departments. All solutions offer the confidentiality and
authentication services. However, these solutions are mainly
dedicated to supply chains and their integrity assurance, as will
be discussed in Section VI-E.
8) Blockchain-Based Trust and Authentication for
Decentralized Sensor Networks
Moinet at al., [44], propose an approach of using the
blockchain technology as a database to store the public keys,
the digital signatures and some peers’ information in a wireless
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sensor network. This approach is similar to Certcoin, since it
allows the nodes to verify and authenticate each other using the
blockchain network. Initially, when a node wants to join the
network, it submits a credential transaction, or a credential
payload as referred in the paper. This transaction has the master
public key and a signed hash value that is used to authenticate
the node. A node can submit a transaction to renew or revoke
its own public key. In addition, this approach introduces a
“blame transaction” which defines the trust level of all nodes in
the network. A node is blamed whenever its trustworthiness
goes below a certain defined level. The blame transaction
includes the node that generated the blame, the blamed node
and the block that had the node ID and the public key included.
Furthermore, all the blocks must have a miner’s approval
transaction to be valid. A miner’s approval transaction would
include the miner ID, a nonce, the new node’s public key, and
the signature of the miner.
It should be noted that this approach is an extension of the
web of trust traditional approach, where a node can join the
network only if another node (miner) approves it. Also, this is
mainly a research work that does not include any proper
blockchain implementation, thus, is not getting practical and
popular compared to Blockstack or Certcoin.

while the verification is done with the node’s ID and the public
system parameters [45].
A generalization of the IBC is to build a Hierarchal IBC
(HIBC) where the public key has a hierarchal identity basis that
can be represented by a tree. For example, the public key of
Alice at organization X is Alice@X rather than Alice. The
encryption phases of HIBC are the same as the four phases in
the IBC with an additional phase, called delegation. This phase
allows an entity to generate secret keys for its children. In other
words, the system needs one PKG to generate the secret key for
the root. Others secret key can be driven from that key [46].

F. Identity-Based Cryptography (IBC)
Recently, identity-based cryptography (IBC) has gained
interest in the network security community. IBC is a public key
mechanism that uses the node’s ID as the public key rather than
generating the traditional lengthy public keys. A node’s ID can
be the node’s name or any arbitrary string that can be used as
the public key. The encryption approach, as depicted in Fig. 5,
consists of four phases: setup, extract, encrypt, and decrypt.

H. Blockchain-Based IBC
Similar to the blockchain-based PKI approaches, the
blockchain technology can be used as a distributed database to
resolve the problems of the traditional IBC approaches. Since,
the blockchain technology has a decentralized database, it
solves the problems of centralization and the single point of
failure. It does not require a third-party trust as the users can
generate their own master keys. However, if a user has limited
resources and cannot generate its own key, it can delegate that
to any other node that it trusts.
The basis of the blockchain-based IBC systems is to let the
users generate their own keys. This indicates that the setup and
the extract phases are done at the user level. Then, the public
parameters are submitted to the blockchain as a transaction. The
blockchain nodes check whether these parameters are valid and
they have not been used before. Any user can later query the
blockchain network for other users’ public parameters which
are used to authenticate the user and encrypt the confidential
messages.
1) Blockchain-Based IBE for Information-Centric
Networking (ICN)
The blockchain-based IBC can be applied to secure the
Information-Centric Networking (ICN) which considers
“content names” as the main element for security, i.e., as the
basis for inter-network communication. Therefore, it is
practical to utilize the HIBC approach to secure the ICN, as the
contents are designed to be hierarchical [46]. In [47], the
authors utilize the blockchain-based IBC to provide distributed
security for the ICN networks, where a content owner wishes to
share some data with the subscribers. This approach consists of
two phases: setup and retrieval. In the setup phase, the owner
generates the public parameters and a secret key that are
required by the HIBC. In other words, the owner acts as a PKG

Fig. 5: Identify-based encryption phases

In the setup phase, a private key generator (PKG) generates
a master secret key along with some public system parameters.
The secret key is kept private while the system parameters are
made public. To extract the keys, the generator uses the system
parameter in addition to its master secret key and the user’s ID.
These parameters are used to construct a secret key which is
sent back to the user. For other nodes to encrypt a message, they
use the ID and the public parameters to generate a ciphertext.
The user uses its own private key to decrypt the message. A
similar approach is used for the signature and the verification,
where the signature is generated with the node’s secret key

G. Problems with the Current IBC-Based Approaches
The problem with both the IBC and the HIBC approaches
is that they require the PKG to generate the private keys.
Therefore, the system is centralized which makes it a single
point of failure and imposes a third-party trust requirement. It
is centralized as the PKG is the only authority that can generate
key pairs. If the PKG is compromised, the whole system is
compromised. In other words, the IBC and the HIBC have the
same limitation as the CA-based PKI traditional approach.
Moreover, the PKG generates the users’ private keys; hence, all
the users should trust the PKG not to misuse their private keys.
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TABLE VI
BLOCKCHAIN-BASED PKI APPROACHES COMPARSION
Approach

Blockchain
platform

Modifies
implementation?

Public key generation

Corresponding traditional approach

Main utilized blockchain properties

IKP

Ethereum

No

By CA

CA

Distributed Database

Pomcor

Ethereum

No

By CA

CA

Distributed Database

Gan’s [36]

Their own

Yes

By CA and DMV

CA

Distributed Database

DPKI

-

-

By user

WoT

All

Blockstack

Namecoin
(Bitcoin)

No

By user

CA and WoT

All

Certcoin

Namecoin
(Bitcoin)

Yes

By user

CA and WoT

All

Guardtime

-

-

By user (PUF)

CA and WoT

Distributed Database

[44]

-

-

By user

WoT

Distributed Database

[47]

Namecoin
(Bitcoin)

Yes

By user

IBC

All

for itself. It registers the public parameters to the blockchain
network by submitting a new transaction. Then, when a
subscriber wants to access the data, it queries the network for
the public parameters of the corresponding content. This means
that instead of consulting the centralized PKG in the traditional
HIBC algorithm, the subscriber consults the distributed
blockchain. These activities are recorded in the transactions;
hence, cannot be denied once the transactions are committed to
the blockchain database. Thus, the blockchain technology can
provide both the integrity and the provenance services, in
addition to solving the centralized architecture challenges.
This scheme can be applied to any ICN or other similar
applications. However, the initial implementations of this
scheme showed a high level of complexity in generating the
public keys. This problem resulted in restricting the scheme’s
practicality and popularity among the resource-limited ICN
applications that are emerging.
I.

Summary
The public key cryptography is an important security
framework that is used widely to provide the authentication and
the confidentiality services. Such services are critical for most
of the current applications including IoT and healthcare. A
management system is required to provide a proper
infrastructure for such services. PKI is a framework to generate,
distribute and manage public keys for the entities in the system.
In this section, we discussed the traditional PKI systems and
how the blockchains can be used to resolve their problems. We
further presented several proposed approaches providing
blockchain-based PKI solutions. Furthermore, we discussed the
IBC technique which is a recent popular technique in providing
security services. We presented the traditional IBC, their
problems, the blockchain-based IBC, and a proposed approach
for a blockchain-based IBC. Table VI shows the comparisons
among the discussed approaches from different perspectives. It
should be noted that even though these systems exist and are
open-source, only few are utilized in real-world applications.
IV. PRIVACY SERVICES
A privacy service offers the user the rights to control and set

rules for its data and resources accessed by the network. In other
words, it enables the data or resource owners to control the
disclosure of their information. This is generally done by letting
the user define his access control list (ACL). In this section, we
investigate the requirements of providing the data privacy, its
importance for the current applications, the traditional
techniques for privacy, and the challenges currently faced in
providing the privacy service efficiently. Then, we give an
overview on how the blockchains can be used to provide
privacy and summarize a few existing blockchain-based
privacy providing systems.
A. Data Privacy and ACL
The data privacy requires that all personal and sensitive
information remain confidential (not public) and access to them
can be controlled by the data owners. The ACL assures that by
defining a set of rules stating who can access a specific set of
data and when. To illustrate the privacy problem, consider the
users in organizations such as Facebook, Google, banks and
government surveillance. Each user must provide his/her
personal information. Thus, these organizations have a massive
amount of personal data that should not be made public.
Individuals have little or no control over the storage and the
access to their information. Therefore, the data privacy can be
violated. Many controversial incidents have been reported,
especially with banks and government surveillance [48] [49].
The privacy concerns exist whenever the data is collected,
stored, used, destroyed, or even deleted. In other words, privacy
applies to the data in motion and at rest. Several federal laws
have been developed to prevent information leakage; as an
instance, the healthcare information privacy laws [50]. For all
these reasons, privacy is a major concern for application and
network developers.
B. Importance of Privacy in Current Applications
The data privacy is a prominent interest in the era of cloud
computing and networking systems where many users share the
same physical storage or network. Application developers
migrate their storage and computations to the clouds and require
the data privacy to be granted. Moreover, IoT, healthcare, smart
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grids, and several other popular networking applications need
to process and store a massively large amount of data, generally
using cloud computing. Privacy is a critical requirement for
most of these applications that are involved with personal
information or location knowledge. The problem of privacy is
intesified in case of using multiple clouds and internetworking
among them.
C. Traditional Techniques for Data Privacy
Generally, the data privacy can be provided by delegating the
ACL definitions to the data owners and using encryption
techniques to prevent others from accessing the data. Hence, the
organizations who amass or process the data have no rights to
access the if the ACL does not permit. Design and
implementation techniques to provide the privacy service is
among the most active research topics, and several techniques
have been proposed so far. For example, homomorphic
encryption, which allows the computation and the processing
the encrypted data and returns encrypted results, is one way to
provide the data privacy service [51].
Another privacy aspect, which is out of the scope of this
paper, is hiding the user’s identity. Data anonymization and
differential privacy mechanisms hide the identity of the user
and make it difficult to link the data to its owner. For example,
K-anonymity, a common way to anonymize the datasets,
requires the sensitive information to be similar to at least K-1
other records [52]. L-diversity, an extension of the Kanonymity approach, guarantees that the sensitive information
is stored in “diverse enough” possible locations [53]. Tcloseness is another approach that looks at the distribution of
sensitive data [54]. Differential privacy uses data perturbation
techniques or adds noise to them before sharing the data [55].
Most blockchain implementations provide pseudo-anonymous
user privacy. For example, Bitcoin utilizes the hashes to
identify the users, rather than their real names. The users stay
hidden from others and remain anonymous to the system unless
sophisticated attack actions are taken [1].
D. Problems with the Traditional Techniques
Despite the fact that several research efforts exist, provide an
efficient data privacy service is still challenging. Some of the
challenges include efficiency, scalability, data ownership and
lack of systematic data lifecycle approach. In the following, we
briefly summarize these problems and refer the readers to [56]
for more detailed discussion.
• Efficiency and Scalability: Most of the data privacy
techniques rely on complex cryptographic algorithms; hence,
they are inefficient and difficult to scale with large
applications. Recent research tries to reduce the complexity
and enhance the efficiency of these cryptographic techniques
[57]. However, the proposed approaches still lack
practicality in most cases. Further, most algorithms fail to
scale with the massive amount of data processing required in
the current networks.
• Data Ownership and Control: The questions of who owns
the data and who can modify it are critical in privacy. The
owner generally is the party that decides the access control

11

rules for the data. Unfortunately, the traditional techniques
discussed in the previous subsection still lack an answer to
the ownership question.
• Systematic Data Lifecycle Approach: A framework for the
data privacy needs to be constructed to systematically define
the lifecycle of the data. This framework should identify the
phases, define their privacy requirements, and allow
flexibility in the lifecycle changes. These phases can include
the acquisition, the sharing and the deletion of the data and
the resources involved in the system . However, a systematic
approach is still missing in most of the proposed privacy
techniques.
E. Blockchain-Based Data Privacy Techniques
The blockchain technology can be used to provide
decentralized end-to-end data privacy guarantees that can
resolve some of the problems discussed in the previous
subsection. Specifically, it can provide the data ownership
solutions and dynamically change the access rights when
needed. However, since the blockchains depend on
cryptographic techniques, the blockchain-based techniques are
still complex. The problems associated with the traditional
approaches and how the blockchain technology can solve them
are presented in Table VII.
TABLE VII
TRADITIONAL DATA PRIVACY PROBLEMS AND BLOCKCHAINBASED SOLUTIONS
The traditional
approach

The problem

The Blockchain solution

ACL Definition
and Monitoring
in addition to
encryption
(Data Privacy)

Efficiency

No solution by the blockchains. The
homomorphic encryption may be still
used and thus the problem still exists.

Scalability

Generally, the blockchains scale better
than the traditional approaches,
however scalability is still a challenge
in the blockchains, which will be
discussed in Section VI

Data
ownership
and control

The blockchain technology can
resolve the problem as it can record
the ownership and the changes in the
data. The user has full control to
define its ACL.

Systematic
lifecycle

The blockchain users can update their
smart contract or establish new
contracts easily and thus the changes
can be flexible. However, they are still
under user control. A programmable
ACL should be written over the
blockchains to make the approach
systematic.

Complexity

Some blockchain platforms can
provide a pseudo-anonymous user
privacy. For example, Bitcoin utilizes
the hashes to identify the users rather
than usernames. The users are hidden
from other nodes and remain
anonymous to the system unless
further actions are taken. Using this,
the pseudo-anonymity is provided.

Anonymity and
Differential
Privacy (User
Privacy)

The idea behind the ideal blockchain-based data privacy is to
build a blockchain layer over the data storage layer, let the
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owner define the desired ACL through smart contracts, and
publish the ACL and the data to as the blockchain transactions
(encrypted using sophisticated encryption techniques). In this
way, organizations such as Facebook or Google will not own
the data as happens in the traditional techniques. However, they
will be a part of the blockchain network and they will be able
to process the data only when the ACL allows them. This type
of blockchains is called the permissioned blockchains. Policies
to define the data access are either based on the smart contracts
or on the data management messages. Further, an off-chain
database can be used to store the encrypted data as the
blockchain memory is limited and cannot store massive
amounts of data. In the following, we discuss several recent
approaches that utilize the blockchain technology to provide the
privacy service.
1) Zyskind ’s Approach
Zyskind, Nathan, and Pentland, [20], propose a decentralized
data privacy approach that ensures the users’ control over their
data and uses the blockchain blocks to store the data and the
ACL. As illustrated in Fig. 6, the system is composed of three
main components: users, providers and the blockchain network.
The users are nodes interested in downloading an application or
using a service. Providers, who hold such services or
applications, need to process the users’ personal data for
operational and business purposes. The blockchain nodes are
the untrusted entities that constitute the blockchain network and
have a distributed data store (off-chain data store). The data is
distributed and replicated among the data stores to ensure the
privacy and the high availability services.

Fig. 6: Zyskind’s proposed system components

The blockchain network accepts two types of transactions:
T access and T data. The T access is used for the control and the
management operations on the data, such as defining the ACL
and modifying the access rights. The T data is used for data
storage and retrieval. The owner can change the permission and
the access controls by sending a policy set in the T access
transaction, which is checked for correctness by the blockchain
nodes. Similarly, a user or a service provider can access the data
by sending a T data transaction which will be approved by the
blockchain nodes if the policies specified earlier are met. The
returned response (access information or denial) is encrypted;
hence, unauthorized users cannot have access the data.
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Zyskind ’s Approach is a research work that has been verified
theoretically and practically in their paper [20]. However, the
open-source implementation of the proposed approach is still
missing thus, practicality and suitability of the proposed
approach are still to be testified.
2) Blockchain-Based Data Sharing (BBDS)
Blockchain-based data sharing (BBDS) is another approach
proposed to provide privacy for the medical records in a cloud
environment [58]. It uses a simplified blockchain architecture
that is scalable and efficient for lightweight communication
systems. The system is composed of three layers: the user layer,
the management layer, and the storage layer. In the following,
we briefly explain the rules for each layer:
• The user layer: The user layer includes the individuals or
the organizations who want to access or store their data and
services.
• The management layer: The management layer includes
issuers, verifiers, and consensus nodes. The issuers
authenticate the users when they first come and handle their
registrations. The verifiers authenticate the users later and
manage their keys. The consensus nodes construct the
blockchain network and process the new blocks the same
way as in Bitcoin processing.
• The storage layer: The storage layer includes cloud-based
data storage and processing infrastructures to securely store
and process the data.
The block structure in the BBDS is simplified by modifying
the transaction and block header fields to meet the healthcare
records requirements. Furthermore, the interactions in the
system are secured by identity-based authentication and
encryption techniques which are simple, efficient, provably
secure, and lightweight.
BBDS is implemented in a private permissioned blockchain
that does not rely on any of the open-source blockchains
discussed earlier in Section II-D. The theoretical and the initial
implementation of the proposed approach showed a good
performance compared to Bitcoin complexity. However, the
full system is under development and thus it is not yet popular
at the time of this writing.
3) FairAccess
FairAccess utilizes the smart contracts to define the access
control policies and make authorization decisions [59]. The
system uses the blockchain transactions to define authorization
tokens. These tokens are used by the sender to authorize the
receiver in accessing parts of the sender’s data. Functions in
FairAccess include: resource registration, grant access, request
access and revoke access.
This approach is not implemented in the paper; however, the
theoretical analyses showed that the data privacy could be
preserved by the provided integrity, authentication, encryption
and consensus access control monitoring.
4) Dynamic Access Control for IoT Using FairAccess
FairAccess has been utilized to provide a distributed,
secured, and adaptive ACL management for the IoT
environments [60]. The proposed idea is to let the users register
their new resources and define their access policies through the

> REPLACE THIS LINE WITH YOUR PAPER IDENTIFICATION NUMBER (DOUBLE-CLICK HERE TO EDIT) <
smart contracts associated with these resources. The process of
requesting a resource, as depicted in Fig. 7, involves several
steps. First, when a request is made for a resource that is held
by user A, it is directed to the blockchain network. In turn, the
blockchain network allows/denies the access request based on
the associated resource’s smart contract. The network sends a
feedback to the requester granting or denying his access
request. Further, the owner can update his/her access policy
based on the received feedback from the blockchain network
using deep reinforcement learning, an adaptive machine
learning mechanism.

Fig. 7: FairAccess resource request process

This approach is implemented and testified for a specific IoT
use-case. The implementation is done on top of Bitcoin and the
results show the feasibility of the proposed approach in
providing the right access control list management. However,
the lack of real-time support, the block complexity and the
inflexible implementation are still drawbacks that burden the
practicality and the widespread of the proposed approach.
5) Decentralized Runtime Access Monitoring System
(DRAMS)
In [61], the authors utilize the blockchain technology to
verify access control logs for clouds in a federated cloud
environment. The key idea is to use the smart contracts in
defining the access rights and collecting the access logs from
different clouds. The blockchain miners compare the access
rights to the access logs. If a violation is detected, an alert is
raised to be further handled by the system.
This approach was implemented on top of the Ethereum
platform. Results show that the system is resilient to many
threats, including compromising the communication channel to
modify the access rights, compromising the policy evaluation
to allow unauthorized accesses, and compromising the logs to
alter or delete them. However, latency, cost and scalability are
the challenges that need to be considered for this platform to
become practical.
6) Data Privacy for IoT Data Storage and Sharing
IoT is witnessing a rapid increase in the number of innovative
applications; however, security is still a major concern. Most
current ACL mechanisms are delegated to a trusted, centralized
controller that maintains and manages the access controls. On
the other hand, the blockchain-based data privacy can help
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resolve the problems with centralization and provide
decentralized, resilient, and auditable privacy guarantees. In
[62], the authors use the blockchain network to securely store
and manage the access permissions. The blockchain
transactions are composed of the ownership of the data and the
corresponding access permissions. Initially, the owner submits
a transaction that includes the data stream identifier. A new
transaction is issued when the owner wants to share the data
with other users or with the service providers. Further, the
owner can revoke his data sharing by submitting a revoke
transaction. When a provider or another user wants to retrieve
a specific set of data, they send a request to the storage node
which queries the blockchain network for the access rights.
Data, in both the blockchain database and the storage nodes, is
encrypted and highly distributed. This mitigates the threats of
malicious storage nodes that grant service access rights without
consulting the blockchain.
An initial implementation of this scheme was built on top of
the Bitcoin platform. Results showed a reasonable overhead due
to the routing loads, the point-to-point communication and the
distributed storage. However, the latency and the scalability
challenges are not resolved, especially for real-time IoT
applications.
F. Summary and Comparisons
The data privacy is a critical security aspect that guarantees
the user’s control over their data disclosures and prevents
unauthorized access and processing. In this section, we
discussed several blockchain-based approaches providing the
data privacy. Such approaches define the ACL either by the
smart contracts or by special management transactions.
Monitoring of the access rules and the violations can be done
by the blockchain nodes to fully eliminate centralization.
Table VIII compares the different discussed approaches. It
should be noted that these approaches handle the data privacy
rather than the user privacy. Most blockchain implementations
provide a pseudo-anomalous user privacy using the hashes to
identify the users rather than their actual names.
TABLE VIII
BLOCKCHAIN-BASED DATA PRIVACY APPROACHES
COMPARISON
Approach

Blockchain
platform

Modifies
implementa
tion

Smart
contract/
transactions

Scalable
solution

Zyskind

Ethereum
(Enigma
platform [59])

Yes

Transactions

No

BBDS

Bitcoin

Yes

Transaction

Yes

FairAccess

Not
implemented
(Ethereum is
planned)

Yes
(planned)

Smart
contract

No

FairAccess
for IoT

Not
implemented

Yes
(planned)

Smart
Contract

No

DRAMS

Ethereum

No

Smart
contract

No

[62]

Yes (Bitcoin)

Yes

Transactions

Yes
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V. PROVENANCE SERVICES
Data or resource provenance is another security service that
deals with the tractability and the auditability of the resources.
In this section, we discuss the traditional techniques provide the
data provenance and highlight their problems. Following that,
we discuss how the blockchains can help in providing a
provenance architecture, highlight some of the proposed
approaches that utilize the blockchain technology to provide the
data provenance services and give a brief comparison among
the different discussed blockchain-based provenance
approaches.
A. Data and Resource Provenance
Data provenance refers to the metadata that tracks and reports
the originality of the data and the operations associated with
them. The metadata includes records of the inputs, the entities,
the systems, and the processes that accessed or manipulated the
data of interest. An example would be the tracking of the data
ownership and the accessing of some information in a cloud
environment. When dealing with clouds, the data are massively
scaled, and the resources are shared by many different entities.
It is important to track the origin of the data and the operations
happened on them, including the reading, the processing and
the writing of the data or the resources. This is not only applied
to the data, but also to any type of resources such as the network
devices, the workflows, the web services, and the processes.
Providing provenance guarantees resource tractability,
forensic capabilities, and auditability. In other words, it helps
the network administrators in detecting any access violation or
any malicious operation. However, this service comes with two
issues, complexity and privacy violation. Keeping track of the
resources is challenging and complex, especially for the
distributed applications. Data or resources can be replicated in
different areas to provide availability and they might follow
different paths to provide resilience guarantees. Furthermore,
the amount of data is massively increasing, which makes
tracking complex and inefficient. Further, such tracking may
violate privacy if the information about the data ownership and
the data originality is exposed. Due to this reason, guaranteeing
the data provenance without violating the privacy is a challenge
to be resolved in the current applications.
B. Importance of Provenance
In the age of social networking, cloud computing, IoT, and
other distributed applications, data is an acute resource that is
open and vulnerable to intrusions. The owners need to know not
only the data originality, but also the manipulations and the
accesses to the data along its lifecycle. For example, in IoT
applications, the sensor data has to be tracked so that they get
to the consumers without any unauthorized modification.
Further, the consumers need to know how accurate the
information is and what time it was sent. This can be achieved
only by proper data provenance techniques. The same
provenance requirements are applied to the healthcare data, the
financial data, the governmental resource, or even scientific
applications. Such applications are worldwide, generating
massive amounts of data that need to be tracked. Hence, the
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provenance guarantees are crucial for these applications.
C. The Traditional Techniques
State-of-the-art techniques in providing the data provenance
in the cloud environments are based on logging and auditing
techniques. Most of these approaches are used at the centralized
authority that manages the system resources. Examples of the
data provenance approaches include PASS [63], S2Logger [64],
and SPROVE [65]. PASS was one of the first approaches to
provide the data provenance service by collecting and
maintaining information about the operations done at the
system level [63]. S2Logger is a tracking tool that provides an
end-to-end resource monitoring in a cloud environment at the
file level [64]. SPROVE is a technique that provides
confidentiality and integrity of the data provenance through
encryption and signature techniques [65]. In addition, in [66],
the authors propose a secure data provenance technique that
utilizes encryption techniques to enhance the privacy of the data
provenance.
D. Problems with the Traditional Techniques
The techniques discussed in the previous subsection have
several challenges, including ineffectiveness, complexity, lack
of privacy and centralized controllers. The cloud hardware and
software are distributed by nature and have several layers of
interoperability, which makes the logging techniques
inefficient. Tracking resources can be complex in nature as the
cloud resources may move to provide load balancing and to
ensure resilience. Further, employing security techniques like
encryption and digital signature can add an additional level of
complexity to the system. However, not having encryption and
signature may break the data privacy if the data’s origin and the
data ownership are exposed to a third party. Finally, to store the
logging information or to monitor the data in a system, a
centralized controller is needed, which requires a trusted third
party that is complex, expensive and a single point of failure.
E. Blockchain-Based Data Provenance
The blockchain technology can be viewed as a shared
immutable ledger that record the events in the system. Thus, it
is a potential approach to provide the data provenance service
by recording the evidence of the data originality and the
operations in the blockchain transactions. However, the
integrity and the confidentiality of the blocks should be granted
by any blockchain-based data provenance. The problems with
the traditional approaches and how the blockchains can resolve
them are presented in Table IX.
In the following, we discuss several approaches that utilize
the blockchains to provide the data provenance service. Further,
we discuss some other supply chain provenance approaches and
how they can be applied to provide the data provenance service.
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TABLE IX
TRADITIONAL DATA PROVENANCE PROBLEMS AND
BLOCKCHAIN-BASED SOLUTIONS
The traditional
approach

The problem

Blockchain solution

Any centralized
data provenance
technique (PASS,
S2Logger, ...)

Ineffectiveness

The distributed nature and
the event recording
properties of the
blockchains can resolve the
problem

Complexity

It is delegated to the
blockchain network and
distributed among the
nodes

Data privacy

The sophisticated
encryption techniques in
the blockchains can help.
However, the verification,
in this case, would be
difficult

Centralized
controller

No centralized controller is
involved

1) ProvChain
ProvChain is a blockchain-based data provenance system
that offloads encrypted provenance records to the blockchain
database in the form of transactions [67]. It utilizes the
blockchain database as a distributed database that provides the
integrity and non-reputability guarantees. The validation of the
data provenance is done off-chain by a centralized provenance
auditor (PA). The system consists of five components: users,
cloud service providers, blockchain network, provenance
database, and the PA. The users are the resource owners or the
data accessors. The providers offer storage services and are
responsible for the users’ registration. The blockchain network
consists of nodes that participate in the system and keep the data
provenance records in the blocks. The provenance database
records all the provenance data on the blockchain network and
locally at the cloud level. Finally, the auditor retrieves the
provenance data from the blockchain database and validates the
blockchain receipt. The interactions among the various system
components are depicted in Fig. 8.
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ProvChain has been implemented and evaluated in [67]. The
results demonstrated the feasibility of the proposed approach
and the ability to supply all the security features provides by the
blockchains. ProvChain utilizes a blockchain database to store
the data provenance records. However, the verification of the
operations and the records is done locally outside the
blockchain network, at a centralized PA. In other words,
ProvChain does not utilize the consensus property of the
blockchain technology.
2) DataProv
DataProv is another platform that uses the blockchain
technology and the smart contracts to provide data provenance
services for the sensitive cloud information [68]. It is built on
top of the Ethereum platform and uses an off-chain JavaScript
module to interact with the users. There are two types of smart
contracts: Document_Track and Vote. A Document_Track
contract is an Ethereum smart contract and is initiated for each
document in the system. The documents can be shared data or
any type of assets shared by the system. The Document_Track
contract includes functions such as add a document, grant a user
access, revoke an access, and track the changes in the
document. The Vote contract records the miners’ votes and
includes functions such as initiate a vote, record a vote and
terminate a process. An overview of the system architecture is
illustrated in Fig. 9. Initially, the user submits any changes in
the data to the blockchain network and submits a vote contract.
The blockchain network asks the miners, or the voters, of the
system to verify the changes and to report back. The voting is
done based on the majority votes from the miners involved and
the votes are recorded for each change. At the end of the voting
phase, the changes to the document are either accepted or
rejected. If the changes are accepted by the voters, then the
Document_Track contract is updated, and the changes are
submitted to the cloud provider. Otherwise, the changes are
rejected after some time and the cloud provider will be notified
to take further actions.

Fig. 9: DataProv architecture

Fig. 8: ProvChain system interactions

DataProv has been implemented on top of the Ethereum
blockchain platform. Drug trials and wheat production are the
specific use-cases used to evaluate the system. The evaluation
is done on real-life scenarios and shows the feasibility of the
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proposed approach in providing provenance guarantees with
low cost and moderate overhead.
3) A Blockchain-Based Approach for Data Accountability
and Provenance Tracking
In [69], Neisse et al. propose a blockchain-based approach
for the data accountability and the provenance tracking. Similar
to DataProv, this approach uses the smart contracts in the public
blockchains to define the access rules for the data. This system
is composed of three main actors: data subjects, data
controllers, and data processors. Data subjects are the owners
of the data and they authorize the data controllers to access the
data. Meanwhile, data processors are the organizations that are
authorized to process the data on behalf of the controllers. This
approach defines three types of smart contracts that can be
summarized as follows:
• The data subject contract for specific controllers: The
owner of the data creates a contract for each specific
controller that has all or portions of the data. This contract
tracks the data shared with the controller, the access rights and
the operations performed by the controller on the data. Hence,
this contract provides the provenance service of the data
shared with that specific controller.
• The data subject contract for specific data: The owner
defines the rules and the access rights of a set of data that is
accessed by any controller in a smart contract. This contract
tracks a specific data shared with any controller and the logs
associated with operations performed on that data. In other
words, it provides provenance for a specific data or a set of
data that can be shared with any controller.
• The data controller contract for data subjects: The
controller creates a contract for any owner that wants to share
the same data with it. This contract defines how the data
received from the data subjects are treated by the controller.
It is used by the subjects, or the owners of the data, to help
decide data sharing rules with that controller. Further, the
contract logs the creation and ownership of the data, which is
also a part of the data provenance guarantees.
These contracts provide both privacy and provenance for the
data shared with the clouds, the grids or even the services shared
with others. Thus, the approach can be used for any security
service; For example, sharing the patient’s personal information
in a smart healthcare system.
Initial implementation showed the feasibility and practicality
of the proposed approach in providing provenance and privacy.
However, the implementation also showed scalability and
performance limitations due to the blockchain’s complexity.
4) Provenance (An Enterprise Project)
Provenance is an enterprise project that offers a blockchainbased tracking of physical items or resources in a supply chain
[70]. It associates every physical product with a digital identity
to provide the traceability and the transparency for that product.
The idea is to have the producers register their products to the
blockchain system with certifications or tags. Then, the
blockchain network tracks the changes made to that product. An
event is recorded to the blockchain each time a change is made,
or a product reaches a certain stage in its lifecycle. In this way,
the products can be traced when shipped from the producers to
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the consumers.
Use-cases showed the feasibility of the Provenance’s
approach to track commercial products such as foods or goods.
Even though Provenance’s technique strictly applies to the
physical products, it can be extended to audit and risk
management of the data in enterprises. For example, it is
possible to track the data in the cloud when they move from the
data center to the user or vice versa. In this case, Provenance
can provide a solution by letting the user register the data in the
blockchain, where the tracking, the recording and the validation
of the data can happen.
5) IBM Supply Chain
Similar to Provenance, IBM provides their own blockchainbased supply chain tracking using the Hyperledger blockchain
platform. The concept is similar to other blockchain-based data
provenance, whereas any change or any operation done on the
data is logged to the blockchain database in transactions. IBM
use-cases are also dedicated to tracking physical products;
however, they can be extended to digital applications easily
[71].
6) Other Blockchain-Based Supply Chain
Even though IBM and Provenance are the most popular
blockchain-based supply chains, there exist some other
approaches that do the same. These approaches mostly care
about the physical products and other goods provenance, but
their approach can be applied to the data and the digital
resources, as in Provenance. BlockVerify is a startup that tracks
counterfeit products to detect frauds. Their main use-cases
include the pharmaceutical industry, luxury products,
diamonds, and electronics [72]. Ambrosus is a startup company
that provides supply chain provenance, mainly for the food
products and medicines [73]. Moreover, EverLedger is another
startup company that provides provenance guarantees for
digital and physical products using a similar concept [72].
F. Summary and Comparisons
With the amount of data that are being processed in the
current applications, it is critical to know and understand the
data originality, validity, and timing. Data provenance is one
way to provide that by tracking the data ownerships and
recording the changes. Provenance is critical for current
applications’ auditing and the detection of security violations.
The traditional techniques are mostly inefficient, complex,
centralized, and have no specific protection for sensitive
information. In this section, we discussed blockchain-based
data provenance and described several approaches to achieve
the data provenance with the blockchains. Further, the
blockchain-based supply chain provenance can be modified to
provide data provenance in multi-cloud environments. Table X
compares these approaches.
The complexity of the communication in DataProv and the
centralized PA in ProvChain show that the blockchain-based
data provenance needs more research effort and can be further
enhanced by proper utilization of the smart contracts.
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TABLE X
BLOCKCHAIN-BASED DATA PROVENANCE APPROACHES
COMPARISON
Approach

Blockchain
platform

Modifies
implementation?

Data or physical
supply chain

ProvChain

Bitcoin

No

Data – single
cloud

DataProv

Ethereum

No

Data - multiple
clouds

Neisse [69]

Their own

Yes

Data- any type of
data sharing

Provenance

Ethereum
(mostly but
not stated)

No

Physical supply
chain mostlydiscussed
Auditing and
management of
data for
enterprises

IBM-Supply
Chain

Hyperledger

No

Physical supply
chain but can be
extended to
multiple clouds

BlockVerify

Their own

Yes

Physical supply
chain

Ambrosus

Ethereum

No

Physical supply
chain

EverLedger

Their own

Yes

Both physical and
digital supply
chain

VI. INTEGRITY ASSURANCE SERVICE
Integrity assures that the data has not been modified or
altered when at rest or in motion. In this section, we discuss the
integrity service, its importance for the current applications, its
traditional techniques, and the challenges associated with them.
Then we highlight how the blockchain technology can help in
the integrity verification and discuss some of the proposed
blockchain-based integrity assurance platforms.
A. Integrity Assurance
Integrity assurance deals with the correctness and the validity
of the data stored, accessed, or generated by the network. It
assures that the information has not been changed or corrupted
by unauthorized users. This should be applied to the
information in motion or at rest. In other words, when the data
is stored in the cloud, generated by a sensor, or is transmitted to
a client, it should not be altered by an unauthorized user.
Providing an end-to-end integrity assurance maintains
consistency, reliability, accuracy, and trustworthiness of the
information over its entire lifecycle. The integrity is one of the
basic components of the CIA (confidentiality, integrity and
availability) triad for information security [74]. Further, it is a
required service by any interconnection system, as was
discussed in Section I-B [15]. Therefore, guaranteeing the
integrity service has been investigated for several decades. In
most cases, integrity is ensured by proper signatures and public
key cryptographic techniques [28]. However, how to define and
trust a third-party authority to verify the integrity is a challenge,
especially in the current distributed networks.
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B. Integrity’s Importance for The Current Applications
Current applications deal with massive amounts of remote
communications that involve many actors, multiple
intermediate devices, and several domains. This makes the data,
the users, and the information inextricably linked to the
cyberspace and vulnerable to many attacks. Attacks include
data thefts and alterations, which might threaten human lives.
For example, in the smart healthcare system, altering the
patients’ information can result in serious consequences, if the
sensor data is altered by intruders. The same threat can target
the IoT platforms, the smart home environments, or the
intelligent transportation systems. Thus, it is critical to provide
integrity for the information shared by the network. Further, it
is important to know the source of the alteration and react to the
changes as quickly as possible.
C. Traditional Integrity Assurance Techniques
Data integrity is commonly assured using cryptographic
tools and data replications. Cryptographic tools such as the
public key cryptography or the keyless signature infrastructure
(KSI) are used to sign the data or the resources so that an
unauthorized person cannot change them. Any change in the
data will be detected by the signature validation techniques. The
process is similar to entity authentication which was explained
in Section III-A. Attacks on such techniques require the attacker
to know the secret key in order to sign the data. Finding the
secret key is challenging, but once realized, the attack becomes
practically unpredictable. Replications can also protect against
the data integrity violations. In this technique, the attacker
needs to modify all the replicas, which can be distributed over
several nodes in a randomized fashion. Thus, combining both
the replication techniques and the cryptographic tools can
provide the system with a strong a data integrity assurance.
These are commonly used nowadays in the cloud environments
[75].
D. Problems with the Traditional Techniques
One of the most critical problems with the previously
discussed techniques is not in verifying the integrity but is in
tracking the intruder who tampered the data. It is not feasible in
practice to find the intruder as the tampering could be done at
the storage phase, at the processing phase, or at the
communication phase. However, knowing the intruders can
help in detecting malicious behaviors, changing the access
control mechanisms and, in some cases, penalizing these
intruders. In addition, the validation of the data is currently
done by a trusted party, which imposes a security risk of trust
and a single point of failure. Further, integrity is normally an
additional security service which adds work, resources, and
complexity to the system.
E. Blockchain-Based Integrity Assurance
Blockchain-based architectures are potential approaches to
solve the problems discussed in the previous subsection. The
problems with the traditional approaches and how the
blockchains can resolve them are illustrated in Table XI.
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TABLE XI
PROBLEMS WITH THE TRADITIONAL INTEGRITY
TECHNIQUES AND BLOCKCHAIN-BASED SOLUTIONS
The traditional
approach

The problem

The blockchain solution

Cryptography
and Replication
Techniques

No Tracking

The blockchains can be
used to save data changes,
thus, they provide the
evidence to the latest
changes (as discussed in
data provenance section)

Integrity is an
additional service

The blockchains include
the transaction integrity
check by design, thus, the
integrity is not an added
service.

Outsider tampering

The blockchain database
cannot be tampered

The blockchains have embedded integrity checks as
transactions are signed by the sender and verified by the miners.
The data cannot be tampered if it is committed to the blockchain
database as discussed before. Thus, the use of the blockchain
transactions to submit the data or any asset guarantees the
integrity service. Moreover, the blockchain technology can be
used to provide evidence for when the data has changed as
discussed previously in Section V on the data provenance. In
the following, we discuss several integrity techniques using the
blockchain technology.
1) Blockchain-Based Data Integrity Service Framework for
IoT Data
In [76], the authors propose a blockchain-based data integrity
framework that uses the smart contracts to achieve its
objectives. This framework is dedicated to IoT applications that
require a producer-consumer architecture. In this architecture,
the owner shares the data with other consumers for specific
purposes. The data is generally shared through the use of the
cloud storage services, where the owner posts the data to the
cloud and the consumers access the data from there. As
discussed in the previous subsection, storing the data in the
blockchain database provides the integrity service. However,
the blockchain database are limited in memory and cannot
handle the massive amounts of data. Thus, storing all the cloud
data becomes impractical.
The idea of this framework is to store encrypted hash values
of the data on the blockchain database and these hash values are
then used to check the integrity. The owner generates the hash
value of the data, encrypts the hash value and sends it to the
blockchain network as a smart contract or a transaction. Further,
the owner posts the data to the cloud and allows other users to
access it. The procedure of the integrity assurance is as follows.
First, the owner or the consumer requests the cloud storage to
provide the data stored in the cloud. The consumer calculates
the hash value of the retrieved data. Alternatively, the owner
could ask for the hash value directly from the cloud if the cloud
is capable of doing hash calculations. Then, the owner or the
consumer consults the network for the hash value of the same
data. If the hash values from the cloud and the blockchain
response match, the data is valid, otherwise, it is not valid.
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This approach has been implemented on a private
blockchain. The initial results showed that this technique can
support the integrity verification efficiently in a small-scale
network. However, as it can be seen, the proposed framework
uses the blockchain technology as a distributed database and it
does not make use of the most appealing blockchain
characteristics. Furthermore, the consumer could be an IoT
device which generally lacks the required computational power
and might be unable to perform all the required computations.
A better approach would delegate the construction and the
validation of the hash values to the blockchain network, which
is consulted for the validity of the data.
2) Storj
Storj is a blockchain-based peer to peer data storage system
that utilizes the blockchain database to store hash values of the
data and verify the integrity. The blockchain technology is
immutable and provides integrity checks by design. Thus, any
storage system that utilizes the blockchain transactions to store
the data can provide the integrity service. The data can be stored
in the blockchain transactions or off-chain by storing some
metadata in the transactions and the data itself in the off-chain
storages. In Storj, the data is stored off-chain while the metadata
referring to the original data is stored in the transactions. The
metadata has the location of the data and the hash of the data.
Whenever the user wants to access the data, it inquires the
blockchain network. The network validates the data stored offchain and returns back the metadata needed to retrieve the
original data. In this way, the integrity is provided efficiently;
however, the requirement of tracking the intruders in case the
data is changed is still not provided [9].
Storj is an open-source implementation that allows secured
and integrity-guaranteed data storage in distributed
applications. It has been verified and tested by many real-case
scenarios. To the best of our knowledge, Storj is the first
blockchain-based cloud storage that is currently used by some
enterprises.
3) Ericsson Blockchain-Based Integrity Assurance
Ericsson partnered with Guardtime to provide integrity
services that allow the application developers to assure the
integrity of their users’ data and assets. They utilize Keyless
Signature Infrastructure (KSI) to generate signatures for the
resources [77]. KSI is a signature technique proposed in 2006
exploiting hash trees and timestamps to construct a signature
for multiple documents. However, the original proposal relied
on a central authority to construct the tree and give the
signatures. Guardtime provides a blockchain-based KSI
approach which is scalable, decentralized, efficient and
provably secure. The Guardtime solution can be used for the
authentication as it was discussed in Section III or for the
integrity assurance. Ericsson utilizes Guardtime to provide the
integrity rather than the authentication. The basic objective is to
verify that a collection of the data generated by an application
has not been modified. The functions provided by the service
include generating a non-invertible signature for the user’s data,
extending the signature or publicizing it, and verifying the
integrity of the users’ data [78].
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The Ericsson service involves two simple steps: signing the
data and verifying the signature. The signature of the data is
recognized by submitting them to the blockchain, where the
signature is simply sent back to the user. The signature is stored
in the blockchain transactions as well as at the user’s system.
To verify the data, the stored signature is submitted to the
blockchain network for verification purposes. The blockchain
nodes will validate the signature and return the expected hash
value if the signature is valid. The user compares its hash value
with the submitted one to determine whether the data was
modified [79].
This service is provided as an open-source software
development kit used by the application developers. It is
currently used in Ericsson cloud solution to provide immutable
evidence for the data stored in their clouds. This service is
expected to get more popular and adopted by other cloud
providers to provide a blockchain-based integrity assurance.
F. Summary
Data integrity assures that the data stored or transferred has
not been tampered. It is normally done by the cryptographic
signature combined with the verification techniques. In this
section, we discussed the data integrity assurance using the
blockchain technology and highlighted some blockchain-based
integrity assurance approaches. The blockchain technology by
itself can provide integrity assurance through non-repudiation
guarantees. Table XII compares the different approaches from
several perspectives. The Ericsson service verifies that a
collection of data has not been altered by storing their signature
on a blockchain.
TABLE XII
BLOCKCHAIN-BASED INTEGRITY ASSURANCE APPROACHES
COMPARISON
Approach

Blockchain
platform

Used cryptographic
approach

Can verify multiple
chunks

Liu [76]

Private
blockchain

PKI

No

Storj

Florincoin
[80]

PKI

No

Ericson

Guardtime

KSI

Yes

It should be noted that none of the proposed approaches
guarantees tracking the intruders if the data has been changed.
Combining the proposed approaches with the data provenance
approaches discussed earlier can provide tracking of the data;
thus, it can detect who was the last changing the data.
VII. BLOCKCHAIN CHALLENGES
Despite the potential benefits of the blockchain technology,
it still has some challenges that limit its practicality for the
security applications discussed in the previous sections. In this
section, we highlight some of these challenges and relate them
to the security applications studied in this paper.
A. Privacy and Anonymity
One of the blockchain’s main properties and advantages is
providing pseudo-user anonymity. This is critical for security
as the public blockchains are open and the user information
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would be exposed to attackers. However, for most of the
discussed approaches, the transactions relate the user identity to
their public key, the ACL, or the provenance data. For example,
the blockchain-based ACL mechanisms relate the ACL to the
users directly; therefore, the users are no longer anonymous.
The same issue is applied to the blockchain-based key
management and blockchain-based provenance. That is, the
privacy and the anonymity features of the blockchains are
flawn. Bitcoin resolves the anonymity problem by using the
user’s public key as the user identification. However, this
provides pseudo-anonymity and further research is needed to
provide fully anonymized approaches that meet the security
application requirements.
B. Computations and Mining Nodes
In most of the current applications, the nodes are simple and
do not have high computational capabilities. That is, the
blockchain clients need to be simple in order to satisfy the low
computation capability requirements. On the other hand, the
security services, in general, require significant computations in
encryption, decryption, and signature. Moreover, as discussed
in Section II, the blockchain technology needs to have mining
nodes with high computational power. For most of the proposed
techniques, the mining challenge would be resolved by
allowing the application nodes to be the blockchain clients and
by introducing dedicated mining nodes that are added just to
perform mining. However, the high computational power
required for these nodes adds to the cost of the system. A better
approach would include reducing the computational needs for
the mining and relating the mining powers to the node
trustworthiness or its reputation in the system. Further, simpler
cryptographic schemes can be developed to reduce the
computational needs for signing and encrypting the data.
C. Communication Overhead
Current applications are highly dynamic; therefore, they
require frequent changes in the access lists and the provenance
data. This forces the nodes to send frequent transactions to
update the ACL or modify the provenance information. On the
other hand, the blockchain technology is a peer-to-peer
network, which indicates that a significant overhead will be
added in terms of the network traffic and the system processing
capabilities. The transactions and the blocks need to be
broadcast as opposed to unicast in the traditional techniques.
Thus, the overhead added to the network is significant and a
considerable challenge. The storage and the processing
overhead bring additional challenges in adopting the
blockchains for security applications.
D. Scalability
The blockchain technology is believed to scale better than the
traditional centralized techniques. However, as reported in [81],
the technology performs poorly as the number of users and
networking nodes increases [81]. This is a major challenge,
especially with network security applications, where thousands
of users need to be served and the network scales up fast.
Furthermore, the dynamicity of the system adds to the scaling
problem as the nodes need to frequently send update

> REPLACE THIS LINE WITH YOUR PAPER IDENTIFICATION NUMBER (DOUBLE-CLICK HERE TO EDIT) <
transactions. The Ethereum platform and the Hyperledger
platform have their own promises for scalability. However, the
performance tests done in [24] show that both platforms still
suffer from some aspects of scalability issues.
E. Time Consumption
Providing security services requires fast processing
capabilities, especially in the current networks, where
milliseconds can cost billions of dollars. Further, mining and
achieving consensus are still time-consuming in the
blockchains. The proposed approaches resolve the problem by
making decisions from the local blockchain logs without
requiring distributed consensus. For example, in the
blockchain-based ACL mechanisms, the access decisions are
made based on the local copies of the blockchain database.
However, this defeats the technology decentralized architecture
and its consensus as the nodes need to trust the local blockchain
database and make centralized decisions. Many promises have
been made to resolve Bitcoin’s time issues in Ethereum and
Hyperledger platforms. However, the time required for mining
is still two or three seconds as compared to the milliseconds
requirement. Furthermore, building encryptions and security
techniques over the blockchains exacerbates the problem of
time complexity since such techniques are complex and timeconsuming. Thus, faster mining and processing techniques are
needed to be able to employ the blockchains for real-time
applications.
F. Summary
The popularity of the blockchain technology in several
nonfinancial applications raised multiple challenges that we
discussed in this section. The discussed challenges are related
to providing security services and meeting the requirements of
the current applications. These challenges include privacy and
anonymity, computations and mining nodes, communication
overhead, scalability, and time consumption. Privacy and
scalability are the most difficult challenges, since they are
related to the blockchain-based security applications. A balance
between the technology potentials and the its challenges should
be considered for efficient designs and solutions. Table XIII
summarizes the blockchain-based security application
challenges. Till now, the blockchain technology does not seem
to be a potential candidate for real-time and delay-sensitive
applications. Thus, the future research should tackle these
challenges for a practical and widespread use of the blockchainbased security applications.
I.

CONCLUSIONS

In this paper, we presented a comprehensive survey on the
utilization of the blockchain technology in providing distributed
security services. These services include entity authentication,
confidentiality, privacy, provenance, and integrity assurances.
The entity authentication and the confidentiality can be
achieved by the public key cryptography using encryption and
the signature schemes. Thus, we discussed different
blockchain-based key management for public key
cryptography. Further, privacy, provenance, and integrity
assurance services were studied each in separate sections.
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TABLE XIII
BLOCKCHAIN-BASED SECURITY APPLICATION CHALLENGES
AND PROPOSED SOLUTIONS
The challenge

The problem

Effect on security for
current applications

Privacy and
anonymity

Most of the proposed
approaches relate the
user identity to the
user information. For
example, a user and
its access control list.

Breaks user anonymity
since the user information
is exposed and it is
possible to relate the user
identity to their
information.

Computations and
mining nodes

Signature,
encryption and
mining require high
computational power
which is not feasible
with the resource
limited application.

Most of the current
application are resource
limited, thus, the
proposed security
management is not
feasible without adding
extra nodes for mining
and simplifying the
signature schemes.

Communication
overhead

The blockchain
network is a peer-topeer network which
imposes high
overhead in term
network traffic and
processing.

As current applications
are highly dynamic, the
ACL and the data
provenance frequently
change. This indicates
that the nodes will be
sending lots of update
transactions which will
magnify the overhead
even more.

Scalability

Bitcoin, Hyperledger
and Ethereum have
scalability issues as
was indicated by
[81].

Most of the proposed
approaches were applied
to limited scale networks.
Testing them to real
applications could be a
challenge, especially for
the blockchain-based
ACL and the blockchainbased provenance.

Time consumption

The time required to
do mining and reach
consensus could be
high especially for
real-time
applications.

The security applications
need fast processing
capabilities especially for
the current resource
constraint applications.

We summarized on the properties that make the blockchain
technology a potential candidate for several distributed
applications. Then, we defined each service, discussed its rules
in the current networking applications, highlighted the
traditional approaches achieving the required service along with
their challenges. Finally, we explained how the blockchains can
help resolve these problems; explored different blockchainbased approaches and presented a comparison of such
approaches. At the end, we studied the challenges that are
currently restricting the blockchain’s practicality for security
applications. The blockchain technology seems to have a great
potential in many applications; however, its practicality in
security applications is still questionable due to several
challenges. Future research directions include resolving these
challenges and testing the different blockchain approaches in
large scale and real-time environments.

> REPLACE THIS LINE WITH YOUR PAPER IDENTIFICATION NUMBER (DOUBLE-CLICK HERE TO EDIT) <
REFERENCES
[1]

[2]

[3]
[4]

[4]

[5]

[6]
[7]

[8]

[9]

[10]

[11]
[12]
[13]
[14]
[15]
[16]
[17]
[18]
[19]
[20]
[21]
[22]

M. Pilkington, “Blockchain Technology: Principles and Applications,”
in Research Handbook on Digital Transformations, 2016. [online]
Available: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2662660, (accessed February 13,
2018).
I. Eyal, A. E. Gencer, E. G. Sirer, and R. V. Renesse. “Bitcoin-NG: a
scalable blockchain protocol,” in 13th Usenix Conference on Networked
Systems Design and Implementation (NSDI'16), Berkeley, CA, USA,
2016, pp. 45-59.
CoinMarketCap.Com, “Crypto Currency Market Capitalization,”
[online] Available: https://coinmarketcap.com/currencies/, (accessed
August 15, 2017).
S. Nakamoto, "Bitcoin: a peer-to-peer electronic cash system," 2009.
[Online] Available: http://www.bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf,.
(accessed February 13, 2018).
STAMFORD, “Gartner’s 2016 hype cycle for emerging technologies
maps the journey to digital business,” August 2016, [online] Available:
http://www.gartner.com/newsroom/id/3412017, (accessed February 13,
2018).
M. Mettler, "Blockchain technology in healthcare: The revolution starts
here," in 2016 IEEE 18th International Conference on e-Health
Networking, Applications and Services (Healthcom), Munich, 2016, pp.
1-3.
K. Christidis and M. Devetsikiotis, "Blockchains and Smart Contracts
for the Internet of Things," in IEEE Access, vol. 4, 2016, pp. 2292-2303.
M. Conoscenti, A. Vetrò, and J. C. De Martin, "Blockchain for the
Internet of Things: A systematic literature review," in IEEE/ACS 13th
International Conference of Computer Systems and Applications
(AICCSA), 2016, pp. 1-6.
B. Betts, “Blockchain and the promise of cooperative cloud storage”,
August 2016, [online] Available:
http://www.computerweekly.com/feature/Blockchain-and-the-promiseof-cooperative-cloud-storage, (accessed February 13, 2018).
L. Mearian, “FinTech builds on blockchain for international mobile
payments,” Computer World, [online] Available
https://www.computerworld.com/article/3233187/mobilewireless/fintech-builds-on-blockchain-for-international-mobilepayments.html, (accessed January 22, 217).
J. Brantley, “Blockchain can help transform supply chain networks in
the chemicals and petroleum industry”, IBM Cross Business Unit White
paper, 2017, [online] Available: https://www01.ibm.com/common/ssi/cgi-bin/ssialias?htmlfid=CHJ12351USEN,
(accessed February 13, 2018).
S. Ahamad, N. Madhusoodhnan, and V. Biju, "A survey on crypto
currencies," in 4th International Conference on Advances in Computer
Science, AETACS, 2013, pp. 42-48.
I. C. Lin and T. C. Liao, “A Survey of Blockchain Security Issues and
Challenges,” in International Journal of Network Security, vol. 195, no.
5, 2017, pp. 653-659.
M. Conti, C. Lal, and S. Ruj, “A survey on security and privacy issues of
bitcoin,” arXiv preprint arXiv:1706.00916, 2017.
M. E. Peck, "Blockchain world - Do you need a blockchain? This chart
will tell you if the technology can solve your problem," in IEEE
Spectrum, vol. 54, no. 10, October 2017, pp. 38-60.
W. Stallings, “Cryptography and network security: principles and
practice,” Pearson Education, 2016.
Bitcoinwiki, “Proof of work”, [online] Available:
https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Proof_of_work, (accessed February 13, 2018).
Bitcoinwiki, “Proof of Stake”, [online] Available:
https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Proof_of_Stake, (accessed February 13, 2018).
Wikipedia, “Proof of Space”, [online] Available:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Proof-of-space, (accessed February 13,
2018).
Wikipedia, “NEM (cryptocurrency)”, [online] Available:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NEM_(cryptocurrency)#Proof-ofimportance, (accessed February 13, 2018).
G. Zyskind, O. Nathan, and A. Pentland, "Decentralizing Privacy: Using
Blockchain to Protect Personal Data," in 2015 IEEE Security and
Privacy Workshop, San Jose, CA, 2015, pp. 180-184.
G. Paul, P. Sarkar, and S. Mukherjee, "Towards a more democratic
mining in bitcoins," in 10th International Conference on Information
Systems Security (ICISS’14), Dec. 2014, pp. 185-203.
M. Castro and B. Liskov, "Practical Byzantine Fault Tolerance," in 3rd
OSDI USENIX, Feb 1999, pp. 173-186.

21

[23] M. Vukolić, "The quest for scalable blockchain fabric: Proof-of-work vs.
BFT replication," in International Workshop on Open Problems in
Network Security, 2015, pp. 112-125.
[24] T. T. Dinh, J. Wang, G. Chen, R. Liu, B. C. Ooi, and K.-L. Tan,
“BLOCKBENCH: A Framework for Analyzing Private Blockchains,” in
ACM International Conference on Management of Data (SIGMOD '17),
ACM, New York, NY, USA, 2017, pp. 1085-1100.
[25] Bitcoin GitHub implementation, https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin,
(accessed February 13, 2018).
[26] Ethereum GitHub implementation, https://github.com/ethereum/goethereum, (accessed February 13, 2018).
[27] Hyperledger GitHub implementation,
https://github.com/hyperledger/fabric-sdk-py, (accessed February 13,
2018).
[28] R. L. Rivest, A. Shamir, and L. Adleman, “A method for obtaining
digital signatures and public-key cryptosystems,” in Communications of
the ACM, vol. 21, no, 2, 1978, pp.120-126.
[29] T. ElGamal, "A public key cryptosystem and a signature scheme based
on discrete logarithms," in IEEE transactions on information theory, vol.
31., no. 4, 1985, pp. 469-472.
[30] N. Koblitz, "Elliptic curve cryptosystems," Mathematics of
Computation, vol. 48, no. 177, 1987, pp. 203-209.
[31] D. Cooper, S. Santesson, S. Farrell, S. Boeyen, R. Housley, and W.
Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and
Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile", IETF RFC 5280, May 2008,
[online] Available: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5280, (accessed
February 13, 2018).
[32] Wikipedia, “Public key infrastructure”, [online] Available:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Public_key_infrastructure, (accessed
February 13, 2018).
[33] C. Ellison and B. Schneier, “Ten Risks of PKI: What you’re not being
told about public key infrastructure,” in Computer Security Journal,
vol.16, no. 1, 2000, pp. 1-7.
[34] S. Matsumoto and R. M. Reischuk, "IKP: Turning a PKI Around with
Decentralized Automated Incentives," 2017 IEEE Symposium on
Security and Privacy (SP), San Jose, CA, 2017, pp. 410-426.
[35] F. Corella, “Implementing a PKI on a Blockchain,” Pomcor Research in
Mobile and Web Technology, [online] Available:
https://pomcor.com/2016/10/25/implementing-a-pki-on-a-blockchain/,
October 2016, (accessed February 13, 2018).
[36] S. Gan, “An IoT simulator in NS3 and a key-based authentication
architecture for IoT devices using blockchain,” Master Thesis, Indian
Institute of Technology Kanpur, [online] Available:
https://security.cse.iitk.ac.in/node/240, 2017, (accessed February 13,
2018).
[37] C. Allen, A. Brock, V. Buterin, J. Callas, D. Dorje, C. Lundkvist, P.
Kravchenko, J. Nelson, D. Reed, M. Sabadello, G. Slepak, N. Thorp,
and H. T. Wood, “Decentralized Public Key Infrastructure,” A White
Paper from Rebooting the Web of Trust, 2016, [online] Available:
https://danubetech.com/download/dpki.pdf, (accessed February 13,
2018).
[38] M. Ali, J. Nelson, R. Shea, and M. J. Freedman, “Blockstack: A global
naming and storage system secured by blockchains,” in 2016 USENIX
Annual Technical Conference (USENIX ATC 16), Denver, CO, 2016,
pp. 181-194.
[39] Wikipedia, “Namecoin,” [online] Available:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Namecoin, (accessed February 13, 2018).
[40] C. Fromknecht, D.Velicanu, and S. Yakoubov, "A Decentralized Public
Key Infrastructure with Identity Retention, " in IACR Cryptology ePrint
Archive, 2014, pp. 803.
[41] J. Benaloh and M.D. Mare, “One-way accumulators: A decentralized
alternative to digital signatures,” in Workshop on the Theory and
Application of Cryptographic Techniques on Advances in Cryptology,
Secaucus, NJ, USA, 1994, pp. 274- 285.
[42] P. Maymounkov and D. Mazieres, "Kademlia: A peer-to-peer
information system based on the XOR metric," in International
Workshop on Peer-to-Peer Systems (IPTPS), March 2002, pp. 53-65.
[43] Guardtime, “Internet of Things Authentication: A Blockchain solution
using SRAM Physical Unclonable Functions,” May 2017, [online]
Available: https://www.intrinsic-id.com/wpcontent/uploads/2017/05/gt_KSI-PUF-web-1611.pdf, (accessed
February 13, 2018).
[44] A. Moinet, B. Darties, and J.-L. Baril, "Blockchain-based trust &
authentication for decentralized sensor networks," in arXiv preprint,
2017.

> REPLACE THIS LINE WITH YOUR PAPER IDENTIFICATION NUMBER (DOUBLE-CLICK HERE TO EDIT) <
[45] D. Boneh and M. K. Franklin, “Identity-based encryption from the Weil
pairing,” in Advances in Cryptology-CRYPTO, Springer Berlin
Heidelberg, vol. 2139, 2001, pp. 213–229.
[46] A. Lewko and B. Waters, “Unbounded HIBE and Attribute-Based
Encryption,” in Advances in Cryptology - EUROCRYPT 2011, Springer
Berlin Heidelberg, vol. 6632, 2011, pp. 547–567.
[47] N. Fotiou and G. C. Polyzos, "Decentralized name-based security for
content distribution using blockchains," in 2016 IEEE Conference on
Computer Communications Workshops (INFOCOM WKSHPS), San
Francisco, CA, 2016, pp. 415-420.
[48] J. Ball, “NSA’s Prism surveillance program: how it works and what it
can do,” The Guardian, June 2013, [online] Available:
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/08/nsa-prism-servercollection-facebook-google, (accessed February 13, 2018).
[49] V. Goel, “Facebook tinkers with users’ emotions in news feed
experiment, stirring outcry,” The New York Times, June 2014, [online]
Available https://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/30/technology/facebooktinkers-with-users-emotions-in-news-feed-experiment-stirringoutcry.html, (accessed February 13, 2018).
[50] HealthIT, “Guide to Privacy and Security of Electronic Health
Information”, April 2015, [online] Available
https://www.healthit.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/privacy/privacy-andsecurity-guide.pdf, (accessed February 13, 2018).
[51] X. Yi, R. Paulet, and E. Bertino, “Homomorphic Encryption and
Applications,” in Springer Briefs in Computer Science, vol. 2, 2014, pp.
27-46.
[52] J. W. Byun, A. Kamra, E. Bertino, and N. Li, “Efficiently kAnonymization Using Clustering Techniques,” in International
Conference on Database Systems for Advanced Applications, 2007, pp.
188-200.
[53] A. Machanavajjhala, J. Gehrke, D. Kifer, and M. Venkitasubramaniam,
"L-diversity: privacy beyond k-anonymity," in 22nd International
Conference on Data Engineering (ICDE'06), Atlanta, GA, USA, 2006,
pp. 24-24.
[54] N. Li, T. Li, and S. Venkatasubramanian,”t-closeness: Privacy beyond kanonymity and l-diversity,” in IEEE 23rd International Conference on
Data Engineering, Istanbul, 2007, pp. 106-115.
[55] C. Dwork, “Differential privacy,” in Automata, languages and
programming, Springer, 2006, pp 1-12.
[56] E. Bertino, "Big Data - Security and Privacy," in 2015 IEEE
International Congress on Big Data, New York, NY, 2015, pp. 757-761.
[57] B. Kreuter, A. Shelat, B. Mood, and K. Butler, “PCF: A Portable Circuit
Format for Scalable Two-Party Secure Computation,” in 22th USENIX
Security Symposium, 2013, pp. 321-336.
[58] Q. Xia, E.B. Sifah, A. Smahi, S. Amofa, and X. Zhang, “BBDS:
Blockchain-Based Data Sharing for Electronic Medical Records in
Cloud Environments,” in Information, vol. 8, no. 2, 2017, p.44.
[59] A. Ouaddah, A. A. Elkalam, and A. A. Ouahman, “Towards a novel
privacy-preserving access control model based on blockchain
technology in IoT,” in Europe and MENA Cooperation Advances in
Information and Communication Technologies, Springer, 2017, pp. 523533.
[60] A. Outchakoucht, E. S. Hamza, and J. P. Leroy, "Dynamic Access
Control Policy based on Blockchain and Machine Learning for the
Internet of Things," in International Journal of Advanced Computer
Science and Applications (IJACSA), vol. 8, no. 7, 2017, pp. 417-424.
[61] M. S. Ferdous, A. Margheri, F. Paci, M. Yang, and V. Sassone,
"Decentralized Runtime Monitoring for Access Control Systems in
Cloud Federations," in 2017 IEEE 37th International Conference on
Distributed Computing Systems (ICDCS), Atlanta, GA, 2017, pp. 26322633.
[62] H. Shafagh, L. Burkhalter, A. Hithnawi, and S. Duquennoy, “Towards
Blockchain-based Auditable Storage and Sharing of IoT Data,” in 2017
ACM Cloud Computing Security Workshop (CCSW), Dallas, Texas,
USA, 2017, pp. 45-50.
[63] K. K. Muniswamy-Reddy, D. A. Holland, U. Braun, and M. I. Seltzer,
“Provenance-aware storage systems.” in USENIX Annual Technical
Conference, General Track, 2006, pp. 43–56.
[64] C. H. Suen, R. K. Ko, Y. S. Tan, P. Jagadpramana, and B. S. Lee,
“S2logger: End-to-end data tracking mechanism for cloud data
provenance,” in 12th IEEE International Conference on Trust, Security
and Privacy in Computing and Communications, 2013, pp. 594–602.
[65] R. Hasan, R. Sion, and M. Winslett, “Sprov 2.0: A highly configurable
platform-independent library for secure provenance,” in ACM

[66]
[67]

[68]
[69]

[70]
[71]
[72]

[73]

[74]

[75]

[76]
[77]

[78]
[79]

[80]
[81]

22

Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS),
Chicago, IL, USA, 2009.
M. R. Asghar, M. Ion, G. Russello, and B. Crispo, “Securing data
provenance in the cloud,” in Open Problems in Network Security,
Springer, 2012, pp. 145–160.
X. Liang, S. Shetty, D. Tosh, C. Kamhoua, K. Kwiat, and L. Njilla,
"ProvChain: A Blockchain-Based Data Provenance Architecture in
Cloud Environment with Enhanced Privacy and Availability," in 17th
IEEE/ACM International Symposium on Cluster, Cloud and Grid
Computing (CCGRID), Madrid, Spain, 2017, pp. 468-477.
A. Ramachandran and M. Kantarcioglu, "Using Blockchain and smart
contracts for secure data provenance management," in arXiv preprint
arXiv:1709.10000, 2017.
R. Neisse, G. Steri, and I. Nai-Fovino, “A Blockchain-based Approach
for Data Accountability and Provenance Tracking,” in 12th International
Conference on Availability, Reliability and Security, Reggio Calabria,
Italy, 2017, pp. 1-10.
PROVENANCE, https://www.provenance.org/, (accessed February 13,
2018).
IBM, “The Path to a Thinking Supply Chain,” Technical Report, June
2017, [online] Available: https://www.ibm.com/watson/supply-chain/,
(accessed February 13, 2018).
B. Dickson, “Blockchain has the potential to revolutionize the supply
chain,” Tech Crunch, November 24, 2016, [online] Available:
https://techcrunch.com/2016/11/24/blockchain-has-the-potential-torevolutionize-the-supply-chain/, (accessed February 13, 2018).
Ambrosus, “Pharmaceutical Goods Quality Assurance and Logistics,”
White paper by Ambrosus, 2017, [online] Available:
https://ambrosus.com/assets/Ambrosus-Pharmacy-v2.pdf, (accessed
February 13, 2018).
P. Savolainen, E. Niemela, and R. Savola, "A Taxonomy of Information
Security for Service-Centric Systems," in 33rd EUROMICRO
Conference on Software Engineering and Advanced Applications
(EUROMICRO 2007), Lubeck, 2007, pp. 5-12.
M. Sookhak, A. Gani, H. Talebian, A. Akhunzada, S. U. Khan, R.
Buyya, and A. Y. Zomaya, “Remote Data Auditing in Cloud Computing
Environments: A Survey, Taxonomy, and Open Issues,” in ACM
Computer Survey, vol. 47, no. 4, 2015, pp. 65:1-65:34.
B. Liu, X. L. Yu, S. Chen, X. Xu, and L. Zhu, "Blockchain-based Data
Integrity Service Framework for IoT Data," in 2017 IEEE International
Conference on Web Services (ICWS), Honolulu, HI, 2017, pp. 468-475.
Ericsson, “Data Integrity Assurance User Guide- I Implementation of
Service in Predix”, User Guide, 2016, [online] Available:
https://www.ericsson.com/globalassets/digital-asset-integrity-serviceuser-guide_rev0726.pdf, (accessed February 13, 2018).
Guardtime, “Keyless Signature Infrastructure,”
https://guardtime.com/technology/ksi-technology, (accessed February
13, 2018).
S. Deshpande, “Implementing blockchain as a microservice for IoT
platforms”, April 2017, [online] Available:
http://cloudblog.ericsson.com/blockchain-microservice-data-integrityiot-platform, (accessed February 13, 2018).
Florincoin, GitHub implementation,
https://github.com/florincoin/florincoin, (accessed February 13, 2018).
K. J. Lubin, “Blockchain scalability - O'Reilly Media”, January 2015,
[online] Available: https://www.oreilly.com/ideas/blockchainscalability, (accessed February 13, 2018).

Tara Salman is an IEEE student member.
She received her BS and MS from Qatar
University Doha, Qatar at 2012 and 2015,
respectively. Her BS was in computer
engineering while her MS was in
computing (networking minor). She is
currently pursuing a PhD at Computer
Science & Engineering at Washington
University in St Louis, Missouri, USA.
From 2012 -2015, she worked as a research assistant at Qatar
University on a NPRP (National Priorities Research Program)
funded project targeting physical layer security. She is working
as a Graduate Research Assistant at Washington University in

> REPLACE THIS LINE WITH YOUR PAPER IDENTIFICATION NUMBER (DOUBLE-CLICK HERE TO EDIT) <
St. Louis since 2015. Her research interest spans network
security, distributed systems, Internet of Things and financial
technologies. She is an author of 1 book chapter, 6 research
articles and has been a presenter at many international
conferences.
Salman is a recipient of the Cisco Certified Network Associate
(CCNA) certification in 2012 and had completed all CCNA
academy levels at Cisco-Academy (Qatar University branch).
Maede Zolanvari is an IEEE student
member. She received her B.S. degree in
Electrical and Computer Engineering from
Shiraz University, Iran, in 2012 and her
M.S. degree in Electrical and Computer
Engineering-Communication from the
same university, in 2015. She is currently a
Ph.D. candidate in computer science and
engineering at Washington University, St.
Louis, MO, USA.
She was a member of Gifted Talent Office at NODET (National
Organization for Development of Exceptional Talents) during
her education at Shiraz University. Since 2015, she has been
working as a Graduate Research Assistant at Washington
University in St. Louis. Her research interests include secure
computer networks, wireless communications, and Internet of
Things.
Dr. Aiman Erbad is an Assistant Professor
at the Computer Science and Engineering
(CSE) Department at Qatar University. Dr.
Erbad obtained a PhD in Computer
Science from the University of British
Columbia (Canada) in 2012, a Master of
Computer Science in Embedded Systems
and Robotics from the University of Essex
(UK), and a Bachelor of Science in
Computer Engineering from the University of Washington
(USA). Since September 2016, Dr. Erbad has been the Director
of Research Support, responsible for all research grants and
contracts. Prior to that Dr. Erbad was the Coordinator of the
Computer Engineering program and the Chair of the
Curriculum and Quality Assurance committee leading to ABET
accreditation and curriculum enhancement efforts at the CSE
department.
Dr. Erbad received the Platinum award from H.H. The Emir
Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani at the Education
Excellence Day 2013 (PhD category) and graduated from Qatar
Leadership Center, which trains rising leaders in different
sectors. Dr. Erbad’s research interests span cloud computing,
multimedia systems, networking, and security. Dr. Erbad’s
research received funding from the Qatar National Research
Fund and his research is published in reputed international
conferences and journals. Dr. Erbad is a member of various
University committees (Policy, Ranking, Institutional
Effective, Intellectual Property, Appeal and Re-instatement)
and the Chair of the University Research Support Committee.
He serves as an Editor in the European Alliance for Innovation
(EAI) Endorsed Transactions on Collaborative Computing, and
as a technical program committee member in various IEEE and
ACM international conferences. Dr. Erbad acts as an expert

23

in information technology strategy and research techniques for
various national entities.
Raj Jain is a Fellow of IEEE, a Fellow of
ACM, and a Fellow of AAAS. He
received BS degree in Electrical
Engineering from APS University in
Rewa, India in 1972 and MS in Computer
Science & Controls from 32 IISc,
Bangalore, India in 1974 and the Ph.D.
degree in Applied Math/Computer
Science from Harvard University in 1978.
He is currently the Barbara J. and Jerome R. Cox, Jr., Professor
of Computer Science and Engineering at Washington
University in St. Louis. Previously, he was one of the Cofounders of Nayna Networks, Inc - a next generation
telecommunications systems company in San Jose, CA. He was
a Senior Consulting Engineer at Digital Equipment Corporation
in Littleton, Mass and then a professor of Computer and
Information Sciences at Ohio State University in Columbus,
Ohio.
Dr. Jain is the winner of the 2017 ACM SIGCOMM Life-Time
Achievement Award, the 2015 A.A. Michelson Award, the
2006 ACM SIGCOMM Test of Time award, the CDAC-ACCS
Foundation Award 2009, the IISc Distinguished Alumnus
Award 2014, the WiMAX Forum Individual Contribution
Award 2008, and ranks among the Most Cited Authors in
Computer Science.
Mohammed Samaka is an associate
professor of Computer Science in the
Department of Computer Science and
Engineering
(CSE),
College
of
Engineering at Qatar University. He
obtained his PhD and Master from
Loughborough University in England and
a Post Graduate Diploma in Computing
from Dundee University in Scotland. He
obtained his Bachelor from Baghdad University.

